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This article addresses globalization from a doubly heterodox regulationist viewpoint. 
The regulation approach is already heterodox in relation to mainstream economics; 
my own perspective also differs from that of the hegemonic Parisian regulation 
school. It can be interpreted as the work of an 'informed outsider'1 who has 
attempted to re-specify the object, modes, contradictions, dilemmas, and limits of 
regulation in three main ways. First, I proceed more consistently than do most 
Parisian regulationists2 today from the Marxist premise that capital involves 
inherently antagonistic and contradictory social relations. Thus my approach 
stresses the inherent limits to the regulation (or, better, regularization) of capital 
accumulation and seeks to avoid a 'premature harmonization of contradictions'3 in 
analysing capitalist social formations.4 Nonetheless, in contrast to the tendency for 
non-Parisian theorists to turn the regulation approach into soft economic sociology, I 
share the Parisians' hard political economy emphasis on the central role of economic 
mechanisms in capital's reproduction and regulation. Second, I aim to provide an 
account of the structural coupling and co-evolution of the economic and extra-
economic in capitalist development that is more radical and extensive than Parisian 
studies have offered.5 My analysis of these issues owes much to Polanyi and 
                                            
 
1 This sobriquet was applied to the present author by Robert Boyer at a conference 
on the regulation approach at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, in November 1997. 
2 The principal current exception here is Alain Lipietz: see Lipietz (1985, 1993). 
3 This term was introduced by Ernst Bloch (1986), as cited Panitch and Gildin (1999). 
4 This does not preclude relative harmony in social relations (social cohesion) in 
specific conjunctures or at specific scales of analysis (cf. Gough 1992). 
5 Delorme, Lipietz, and Théret have all referred in different ways to self-organization, 
autopoieisis, and structural coupling. Théret's analysis is closest to that proposed 
below. See Delorme (1991, 1995), Lipietz (1985), and Théret (1991, 1992). 
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Luhmann and recent students of governance. In contrast to the approaches of most 
such thinkers, however, mine remains firmly rooted in Marxist political economy. In 
particular I will suggest how one can use their ideas to reformulate the traditional but 
inadequate Marxist principle of 'economic determination in the last instance' and to 
radically rethink its implications for base-superstructure relations. Third, while 
Parisian regulationists often privilege the national level in their analyses – an 
understandable tendency given their initial focus on Atlantic Fordism and its crisis, 
my analysis is more concerned with the creation and articulation of different scales of 
accumulation and regulation. My account is closer here to other variants of the 
regulation approach, notably the Grenoble and Amsterdam schools, and its 
appropriation by geographers (e.g., Groupe de recherche sur la régulation 
d'économies capitalistes 1991; Overbeek 1993; van der Pijl 1998; MacLeod 1998).  
 
This approach is applied below to five issues regarding globalization. Much of the 
confusion surrounding this topic derives from failures to examine the 
interconnections among different scales and/or to define and analyse relevant topics 
of inquiry at equivalent levels of abstraction-concreteness and simplicity-complexity. 
Thus it is important to distinguish scales and levels of analysis in exploring the five 
issues. They comprise: (1) the structural and strategic dimensions of globalization 
seen from a perspective that is temporal as well as spatial; (2) the role of 
globalization, especially in its neo-liberal form, in enhancing the ecological 
dominance of the capitalist economy, i.e., in enhancing the relative primacy of the 
capital relation in an emerging world society; (3) the significance of the global scale 
for capitalist reorganization and its relationship to other scales of economic activity; 
(4) the impact of the new scalar dynamics of globalizing capitalism on the relative 
primacy and forms of appearance of capital's inherent contradictions and dilemmas; 
and (5) the implications of globalization for the state and politics. 
 
To address these issues adequately, however, the theoretical underpinnings of my 
doubly heterodox regulationism must first be presented. Thus I begin with a 
strategic-relational analysis of capital and its inherent contradictions and dilemmas 
and also assess its implications for the regularization of capital accumulation. Then 
follows a review of some key concepts from evolutionary theory for analysing the 
relation between the economic and extra-economic moments of capital accumulation 
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and the conditions under which the self-expansion of a globalizing capital might 
come to dominate an emerging world society. Next comes a discussion of the spatio-
temporal fixes that help to secure the always partial, provisional, and unstable 
equilibria of compromise that seem necessary to consolidate an accumulation 
regime and its mode of regulation. This involves not only relatively stable institutions 
but also capacities for governance in the face of turbulence. Thus equipped, I then 
offer some provisional answers to the five issues mentioned above. My contribution 
ends with some general remarks on the limits to neo-liberal globalization. 
 
Capital as a Social Relation and an Object of Regulation 
 
In preliminary methodological remarks, Marx argued that there is neither production 
in general nor general production – only particular production and the totality of 
production. He added that one could still theorize production in general as a 'rational 
abstraction' in order to fix the elements common to all forms of production prior to 
examining distinct forms and modes of production and their overall articulation in 
particular economic formations. Thus, rather than develop a transhistorical account 
of production in general or general production (as still occurs in orthodox economics, 
with its emphasis on the generic features of economizing conduct), attention should 
be focused on 'a definite production' and how this in turn 'determines a definite 
consumption, distribution, and exchange as well as definite relations between these 
different moments' (Marx 1973: 85, 99, italics in original). These relations are never 
purely technical or economic but always already social. For, as Marx noted in regard 
to capitalism, capital is not a thing but a social relation (Marx 1974: 717). 
 
Marx located the defining feature of capitalism as a mode of production in the 
generalization of the commodity form to labour-power. It was this that enabled the 
self-valorization of capital. For only then did capital's sole source of surplus-value 
acquire a commodity form, economic exploitation through the appropriation of 
surplus labour acquire its distinctive capitalist mediation through exchange relations, 
and the disposition of labour-power become subject to capitalist laws of value. The 
dominance of the value-form in the organization of labour markets and production 
shapes the nature and stakes of class struggle between capital and labour as well as 
the forms of inter-capitalist competition around the most effective valorization of 
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labour-power. Continuing attempts to valorize capital in these conditions are the 
main source of capitalism's economic dynamism. 
 
Marx identified a fundamental contradiction in the commodity form between 
exchange- and use-value. This was the basis on which he unfolded the complex 
nature of the capitalist mode of production and its dynamic; and showed both the 
necessity of periodic crises and their role in re-integrating the circuit of capital as a 
basis for renewed expansion. Building on this argument, I suggest that all economic 
forms of the capital relation embody different but interconnected versions of this 
contradiction and that these impact differentially on (different fractions of) capital and 
on (different strata of) labour at different times and places. They also have 
repercussions going well beyond the circuits of capital in the wider social formation. 
These contradictions are necessarily reproduced as capitalism itself is reproduced 
but they need not retain the same relative weight or significance for accumulation or 
regulation. It is important to add here that 'the reproduction of these contradictions 
with their contradictory effects and their impact on the historical tendency of capitalist 
development depends on the class struggle' (Poulantzas 1975, 40-1, italics in 
original). For the dynamic of accumulation, including transitions between stages or 
forms of capitalism, is closely related to social struggles.6 These act as the vector 
through which contradictions and dilemmas are realized in specific conjunctures.  
 
Given these premises, one must ask what precisely is the object of regulation that 
has so pre-occupied regulation theorists? Obviously, if there is no production in 
general or general production, there can be no regulation in general nor general 
regulation. Instead, following Marx, we can expect 'a definite regulation' oriented to 'a 
definite consumption, distribution, and exchange as well as definite relations 
between these different moments'. In the case of capitalism, the object of regulation 
is, of course, capital as a social relation. It is important here to consider not only the 
                                            
6 My substitution of 'social struggles' for Poulantzas's term 'class struggles' is 
deliberate. What is important is the class-relevance of struggles (whether or not 
conducted by so-called class organizations in pursuit of explicit class interests), i.e., 
their impact on capitalist reproduction and regularization. A wide range of struggles 
affect these processes (see below; also Jessop 1997a). 
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articulation of the technical and social division of labour within the circuits of capital 
but also the articulation between its economic and extra-economic moments. Thus 
the regulation approach emphasizes not only the labour process and accumulation 
regimes but also the mode of regulation (including the wage relation, forms of 
competition, money, the state, and international regimes) and the broader social 
consequences of the dominance of capital accumulation. In short, the scope of 
reproduction-régulation extends well beyond the capitalist economy in its narrow 
sense (profit-oriented production, market-mediated exchange) to include the direct 
and indirect extra-economic conditions of accumulation as well as the handling of the 
various repercussions of commodification and accumulation on the wider society.  
 
The next question is: why does capitalism need regulating? The answer suggested 
here is the indeterminate but antagonistic nature of this social relation and its 
dynamic. This has three key aspects, listed here in increasing order of concreteness 
and complexity:  
 
(a) the constitutive incompleteness of the capital relation in the real world such 
that its reproduction depends, in an unstable and contradictory way, on 
changing extra-economic conditions;  
(b) the various structural contradictions and strategic dilemmas inherent in the 
capital relation and their forms of appearance in different accumulation 
regimes, modes of regulation, and conjunctures; and 
(c) conflicts over the regularization and/or governance of these contradictions 
and dilemmas as they are expressed both in the circuit of capital and the 
wider social formation.  
  
First, the constitutive incompleteness of capital refers to the inherent incapacity of 
capitalism as a mode of production to achieve self-closure, i.e., to reproduce itself 
wholly through the value form. This incompleteness is a defining, i.e., naturally 
necessary, feature of capitalism. For, even at the most abstract level of analysis, let 
alone in actually existing capitalism(s), accumulation depends on maintaining an 
unstable balance between its economic supports in the various expressions of the 
value forms and its extra-economic supports beyond the value form. This rules out 
the eventual commodification of everything and, a fortiori, a pure capitalist economy. 
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In other words, capitalism does not (and cannot) secure the tendential self-closure 
implied in the self-expanding logic of commodification. This is rendered impossible 
by the dependence of capital accumulation on fictitious commodities and extra-
economic supports. Instead we find uneven waves of commodification, de-
commodification, and re-commodification as the struggle to extend the exchange-
value moments of the capital relation encounters real structural limits and/or 
increasing resistance and seeks new ways to overcome them (Offe 1984). Moreover, 
as we shall see below, this is also associated with uneven waves of territorialization, 
de-territorialization, and re-territorialization (Brenner 1997; 1998; 1999a; 1999b). 
 
Second, the various structural contradictions and strategic dilemmas inherent in the 
capital relation are all expressions of the basic contradiction between exchange- and 
use-value in the commodity form. There are different forms of this contradiction. The 
commodity is both an exchange-value and a use-value; productive capital is both 
abstract value in motion (notably in the form of realized profits available for re-
investment) and a concrete stock of time- and place-specific assets in the course of 
being valorized; the worker is both an abstract unit of labour-power substitutable by 
other such units (or, indeed, other factors of production) and a concrete individual 
with specific skills, knowledge, and creativity; the wage is both a cost of production 
and a source of demand; money functions both as an international currency 
exchangeable against other currencies (ideally in stateless space) and as national7 
money circulating within national societies and subject to state control; land functions 
both as a form of property (based on the private appropriation of nature) deployed in 
terms of expected rents and as a natural resource (modified by past actions) that is 
more or less renewable and recyclable. Likewise, the state is not only responsible for 
securing certain key conditions for the valorization of capital and the social 
reproduction of labour power as a fictitious commodity but also has overall political 
responsibility for maintaining social cohesion in a socially divided, pluralistic social 
formation. In turn, taxes are both an unproductive deduction from private revenues 
(profits of enterprise, wages, interest, rents) and a means of financing collective 
investment and consumption to compensate for so-called 'market failures'.8  
                                            
7  Plurinational monetary blocs organized by states could also be included here. 
8  States also fail, of course; as does governance (Jessop 1998). 
 6
 Such structural contradictions and associated strategic dilemmas are permanent 
features of the capital relation but assume different forms and primacies in different 
contexts. They also frequently find expression in different agents, institutions, and 
systems as the prime bearers of one or other aspect of a given contradiction or 
dilemma (see below). They can also prove more or less manageable depending on 
the specific 'spatio-temporal fixes' and the institutionalized class compromises with 
which they are from time to time associated. Nonetheless, insofar as these 
compromises marginalize forces that act as bearers of functions or operations 
essential to long-run accumulation, the emergence of significant imbalances, 
disproportionalities, or disunity in the circuit of capital will tend to strengthen these 
marginalized forces and enable them to disrupt the institutionalized compromises 
associated with a particular accumulation regime, mode of regulation, state form, 
and spatio-temporal fix (cf. Clarke 1977). Such crises typically act as a steering 
mechanism for the always provisional, partial, and unstable re-equilibration of capital 
accumulation (cf. Lindner 1973; Hirsch 1976, 1977). 
 
Third, modes of regulation and governance vary widely. This follows from the 
constitutive incompleteness of the capital relation and the various forms of 
appearance of capitalism, accumulation regimes, and modes of regulation, the 
relative weight of different contradictions, etc.. For there are different ways to seek 
the closure of the circuit of capital and to compensate for its lack of closure. Which of 
these comes to dominate depends on the specific social and spatio-temporal 
frameworks within which these attempts occur. Indeed, notwithstanding the tendency 
for capital accumulation to expand until a single world market is achieved, there are 
important counter-tendencies and other limits to complete globalization. Hence 
specific accumulation regimes and modes of regulation are typically constructed 
within specific social spaces and spatio-temporal matrices. It is this tendency that 
justifies the analysis of comparative capitalisms and of their embedding in specific 
institutional and spatio-temporal complexes; and also justifies exploration of the 




Attention to these issues can provide the basis for typologies for comparative and/or 
historical analysis. The differential competitive advantages of nations, variations in 
national or regional systems of innovation, contrasting historical patterns of finance-
industry relations, and different modes of economic governance, to take just four 
examples, cannot be fully explained without referring both to the structural coupling 
and co-evolution of economic and extra-economic systems and to the differential 
embedding, disembedding, and re-embedding of economic relations in the lifeworld 
and various extra-economic institutional orders. These same factors also shape the 
forms of internationalization that are pursued from different national economic 
spaces and/or by multinational firms with their home base in different national 
economies. Thus Ruigrok and van Tulder have demonstrated that US, European, 
and Japanese firms tend to pursue different internationalization strategies based on 
the specificities of their home bases – leading to the non-exclusive dominance of 
globalization strategies in the USA, of glocalization strategies in Japan, and of multi-
domestic internationalization strategies in Continental Europe (Ruigrok and van 
Tulder 1995: 174-99). These strategies are associated in turn with different 
preferences in the strategic trade policy pursued by the states that provide the home 
base for these firms (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995: 231-38). I return to these 
arguments below. Moreover, if different accumulation regimes and/or modes of 
regulation can be shown to succeed each other, this can also inform chronological 
and/or causal analyses of capital's periodization (Jessop 2001).  
 
This approach also implies that the genesis of specific modes of regulation is 
historically contingent rather than capitalistically pre-ordained and that the objects of 
regulation do not, and cannot, pre-date regulation in their full historically constituted 
identity. Regulation is always historically specific and the forms it assumes in 
different contexts modify the objects subject to regulation. Hence modes of 
regulation and their objects can be seen as structurally coupled and historically co-
evolving and no a priori primacy should (or could) be accorded to one or other. 
Because capitalism is underdetermined by the value-form, each mode of regulation 
compatible with continued reproduction imparts its own distinctive structure and 
dynamic to the circuit of capital – including distinctive forms of crisis and breakdown. 
This implies that there is no single and unambiguous 'logic of capital' but, rather, a 
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number of such logics with a strong family resemblance.9 Each of these will be 
determined through the dynamic interaction of the value-form (as the invariant 
element) and specific modes of regulation and accumulation strategies (as the 
variant element) (cf. Jessop 1990a: 310-11). Moreover, since each accumulation 
regime and/or mode of regulation is the product of the variable articulation between 
the economic and the extra-economic in specific spatio-temporal conjunctures, these 
distinctive structures and dynamics are always overdetermined by the embedding of 
the circuit of capital in broader social relations. This embedding is not simply a 
matter of interpersonal relations à la Granovetter (1985) but extends to institutional 
embedding (Polanyi 1944, 1957) and the coupling of economic and extra-economic 
system logics (Messner 1997; Willke 1992, 1996).  
 
A third implication is that the social struggles that serve as vectors for realising 
contradictions and dilemmas in specific conjunctures are not reducible to class 
struggles – let alone economic class struggles. They include many different social 
forces and many different types of struggle. For, taking account of the economic and 
extra-economic preconditions of capital accumulation and the problems involved in 
extending exchange relations into other systems and the lifeworld, one can identify 
many different sites and forms of social struggle that affect accumulation. Few are 
best described in terms of 'class struggle'. I prefer to restrict this term to struggles to 
establish, maintain, or restore the conditions for self-valorization within the capitalist 
economy understood in its integral sense.10 Even here the class relevance of 
struggles is never given once-and-for-always but is both fought for and played out 
over time and space. Other types of struggle relevant to capitalist reproduction 
include struggles to resist extending the logic of accumulation (hence 
commodification or re-commodification) to non- or de-commodified social systems; 
struggles to prevent the colonization of the 'lifeworld' in defence of identities and 
                                            
9  Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance' of language games is a weaker notion than 
that posited here. Whereas there is no underlying logic to all conceivable language 
games, capitalism does have such a logic (see Bernans 1999). 
10  By analogy with Gramsci's inclusive definition of the state, the integral economy 
can be defined as 'accumulation regime + mode of regulation' or 'the self-
valorization of capital in and through régulation' (cf. Jessop 1997b). 
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interests that lie outside and/or cross-cut class interests (e.g., gender, race, nation, 
stage in the life-course, citizenship, human rights, or the environment); and struggles 
over the dominant/hegemonic principle of societalization – struggles that extend well 
beyond class struggles, even broadly understood (cf. Jessop 1997a).  
 
Ecological Dominance, Structural Coupling, and Co-Evolution 
 
Marxist analysis commonly presupposes the primacy of the relations of production 
over the forces of production11 in the mutual development of technologies and the 
economy. Affirming this does not commit one, however, to the notorious principle of 
determination in the last instance of the extra-economic by the economic. Indeed, in 
the last instance, this is a theoretically incoherent notion. For production relations12 
can be regarded as primary only in the economy and not in the wider society. But 
one could defend such a principle of determination if it were couched in systems-
theoretical terms, i.e., in terms of the economy's 'ecological dominance' vis-à-vis 
other systems in its environment.  
 
The idea of ecological dominance emerged in work on plant and animal ecosystems, 
where it refers to the capacity of one species to exert an overriding influence on 
others in a given ecological community. This is not the place to discuss evolution in 
biological ecosystems. However, I do want to suggest that the notion of 'ecological 
dominance' can be usefully extended to social systems once allowance is made for 
their specificities as communicatively- or discursively-mediated systems and for the 
capacity of social forces to reflect and learn about their own evolution and engage in 
attempts (successful or not) to guide it. Thus one could study social systems as 
bounded ecological orders formed by the co-presence of operationally autonomous 
                                            
11 The forces of production include social skills and forms of social organization as 
well as technical means of production (tools, machines, informatics). 
12  Relations of production must be understood here as 'social relations of economic 
production'. It is always possible to extend this notion to equivalent relations in 
other fields of social practice (political, military, legal, etc.) but this deprives the 
notion of economic determination of any meaning since relations of production 
then become a feature of all social practices and they lose any specificity. 
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systems and the lifeworld – with the structural coupling and co-evolution of these 
systems and the lifeworld mediated by various competitive, co-operative, and 
exploitative mechanisms. Ecological dominance would then refer to the capacity of a 
given system in a self-organising ecology of self-organising systems to imprint its 
developmental logic on other systems' operations through structural coupling, 
strategic co-ordination, and blind co-evolution to a greater extent than the latter can 
impose their respective logics on that system. 
 
Such ecological dominance is always a relative, relational, and contingent feature of 
operationally autonomous systems. Thus a given system can be more or less 
ecologically dominant, its dominance will vary in relation to other systems and 
spheres of the lifeworld, and it will depend on the overall development of the 
ecosystem as a whole. It follows that there is no 'last instance' in relations of 
ecological dominance. Instead it is a contingently necessary rather than a naturally 
necessary aspect of a given operationally autonomous system. In other words, we 
are dealing with an ecological relation wherein some systems may be dominant, but 
not where one dominates (Morin 1980: 44). Later I propose that the economy is the 
ecologically dominant system in contemporary societies (especially in its globalizing 
form) but I first elaborate the general concept. 
 
Luhmann has suggested that the functional sub-system that attains the highest 
degree of organized complexity and flexibility will tend to dominate the wider societal 
system in which it is located. For its dynamic will then have a greater influence on 
the performance of other sub-systems than they do on it (Luhmann 1974, 1981). 
This suggestion can be taken further in regulationist terms by identifying five 
analytically distinct, but empirically interrelated, aspects13 of an operationally 
autonomous system that affect its potential for dominance. These are: (1) the extent 
of its internal structural and operational complexity and associated in-built 
redundancies, i.e., alternative ways of operating and communicating information, and 
the resulting degrees of freedom this gives it in how a given outcome may be 
achieved; (2) its ability to continue operating, if necessary through spontaneous, 
                                            
13 Only the first two aspects are explicitly theorized in autopoietic systems theory; the 
others derive from more general work on complexity and chaos theories. 
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adaptive self-reorganization, in a wide range of circumstances and in the face of 
more or less serious perturbations; (3) its capacities to distantiate and compress its 
operations in time and space in order to exploit the widest possible range of 
opportunities for expanded self-reproduction; (4) its capacity to resolve or manage its 
internal contradictions, paradoxes, and dilemmas, to displace them into its 
environment, or defer them into the future; and (5) its capacity to get actors in other 
systems and the lifeworld to identify its own operations as central to the reproduction 
of the wider system of which it is merely a part – and thus to subordinate their own 
operations to their understanding of its particular reproduction requirements. These 
aspects can be decomposed into many, more specific features attributable to 
complex, operationally autonomous systems and there have been many suggestions 
regarding the best criteria for identifying and operationalizing them (see, for example, 
Ashby 1958; Bendor 1985; Cillier 1998; Grabher 1994; Luhmann 1986; Morin 1980; 
Thompson 1994; Willke 1996).  
 
Overall, where one system has superior capacities in these regards than the other 
systems in its environment, it will tend to be ecologically dominant. This does not 
exclude reciprocal influences on the ecologically dominant system. Nor does it 
exclude resistances to such dominance or attempts to brake or guide it through 
various forms of strategic co-ordination and meta-governance (see below). Indeed, 
one of the distinctive features of social systems is their capacity to engage in self-
reflexive attempts to alter their environments, to guide their (co-)evolution, and even 
to change the forms in which (co-)evolution occurs (cf. Willke 1996: 48-51). 
 
Ecological dominance is an emergent relationship between systems rather than a 
pre-given property of a single system and, as such, it depends on specific structural 
and conjunctural conditions. First of all, it presupposes the operational autonomy of 
the ecologically dominant system vis-à-vis other systems. This in turn presupposes 
clear boundaries between organizations or other social forces and/or a high degree 
of functional differentiation in macro-social formations. Pre-capitalist economies 
could not have been ecologically dominant, for example, because they were deeply 
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embedded in wider social relations and lacked an autonomous operational logic.14 
Only with the generalization of the commodity form to labour-power does the 
capitalist economy acquire a sufficient degree of operational autonomy. But even 
when capitalism has gained its distinctive self-valorising dynamic, ecological 
dominance is one of its contingent and historically variable features rather than one 
of its generic, naturally necessary properties. For it depends on the specific qualities 
of particular accumulation regimes and modes of regulation, the general nature of 
the other systems in its environment, and specific conjunctural features.  
 
We should note here the considerable historical and conjunctural variability in the 
structural and operational complexity and equifinality of capitalist economies; in their 
capacity for self-reorganization; in their power to stretch and compress economic 
relations in time and space; in their ability to handle contradictions, paradoxes, and 
dilemmas; and their capacities to secure support for the primacy of accumulation 
over other principles of societalization. And we should note, conversely, that other 
systems vary in their capacity to limit or resist the commodification of social relations 
and to contain the scope of different economic processes within specific territorial 
boundaries. Indeed the ecological dominance of capitalism would seem closely 
related to the extent to which its degrees of freedom, opportunities for self-
reorganization, scope for time-space distantiation and compression, externalization 
of problems, and hegemonic capacities can be freed from confinement within limited 
ecological spaces policed by another system (such as a political system segmented 
along Westphalian lines into mutually exclusive sovereign territories). This is where 
globalization, especially in its neo-liberal form, becomes significant for the relative 
ecological dominance of the capitalist economic system.  
 
Moreover, even when the conditions do exist for the capitalist economy to become 
ecologically dominant in the long-term, crises elsewhere could well lead to other 
systems acquiring short-term primacy. This is inherent in the fact that no subsystem 
represents, or can substitute for, the whole. For, as noted above, each autopoietic 
system is both operationally autonomous and substantively interdependent with 
                                            
14 Cf. Polanyi's contrast between an 'instituted economy' embedded in wider social 
relations and a 'market economy' structurally coupled to a market society (1957). 
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other systems. It follows that even an ecologically dominant system depends on the 
performance of other systems and that primacy may even shift to a system that is 
normally non-dominant in specific conjunctures. This would happen to the extent that 
solving crises affecting them and/or solving more general crises that require their 
distinctive contributions becomes the most pressing problem for the successful 
reproduction of all systems – including the capitalist economy. For example, during 
major international or civil wars or preparations for such events, national states may 
seek to subordinate economic activities to politico-military requirements. This can be 
seen in both World Wars in the twentieth century and in the activities of national 
security states during the Cold War. After such states of emergency (note the term), 
however, considerations of accumulation are likely to re-assert themselves. This 
does not exclude, of course, path-dependent traces of such exceptional conditions 
within the normally dominant system (e.g., the distinctive features of peacetime war 
economies or the legacies of total war on post-war economic trajectories). But the 
ecologically dominant system will still have a larger impact on other systems' 
development in the multilateral process of structural coupling and co-evolution than 
these other systems do on it.  
 
In general terms, one could argue that the economic system is internally complex 
and flexible because of the decentralized, anarchic nature of market forces and the 
role of the price mechanism both as a stimulus to learning and as a flexible means of 
allocating capital to different economic activities. More specifically, as capitalism 
develops, different organizations, institutions, and apparatuses tend to emerge to 
express different moments of its contradictions, paradoxes, and dilemmas and these 
then interact in an unstable equilibrium to compensate for market failures. Capital 
also develops its capacity to extend its operations in time and space (time-space 
distantiation) and to compress its operations, making it easier to follow its own logic 
in response to perturbations (time-space compression). Through these and other 
mechanisms it develops the capacity to escape the structural constraints and control 
attempts of other systems. This can occur through its own internal operations in time 
(discounting, insurance, risk management, futures, etc.) or space (capital flight, 
relocation, extra-territoriality, etc.) or through attempts to subvert these systems 
through personal corruption or colonization by the commodity form. This is truer of 
the exchange-value moment of the capital relation with its capacity to flow through 
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time and space – and less true of capital considered in its substantive aspects. For 
capital in its substantive aspects is itself always already strongly overdetermined by 
its embedding in other social orders and its coupling to other systems (see below). In 
addition to its greater complexity and flexibility, the capitalist economy has a greater 
capacity for perturbing other subsystems and also makes greater demands on their 
performance as preconditions of its own reproduction. 
 
Globalization powerfully reinforces this always-tendential ecological dominance in at 
least five interrelated respects. Before specifying these, however, it is important to 
note that globalization is not a single causal process but the complex, emergent 
product of many different forces operating on various scales. The first aspect is that 
globalization is associated with an increasing complexity of the circuits of capital and 
an increasing flexibility in its response to perturbations. Second, globalization 
enhances capital's capacity to defer and displace its internal contradictions, if not to 
resolve them, by increasing the scope of its operations on a global scale, by enabling 
it to deepen spatial and scalar divisions of labour, and by creating more opportunities 
for moving up, down, and across scales. These enhanced capacities are associated 
with a marked reinforcement of uneven development as the search continues for 
new spatio-temporal fixes. This is closely related to time-space distantiation and 
time-space compression. Third, it reinforces the emancipation of the exchange-value 
moment of capital from extra-economic and spatio-temporal limitations. This extends 
the scope for capital's self-valorization dynamic to develop in a one-sided manner at 
the expense of other systems and the lifeworld. Fourth, it magnifies capital's capacity 
to escape the control of other systems and to follow its own procedures in deciding 
how to react to perturbations. This is particularly associated with its increased 
capacity for discounting events, its increased capacity for time-space compression, 
its resort to complex derivative trading to manage risk, and its capacities to jump 
scale. Fifth, it weakens the capacity of national states to confine capital's growth 
dynamic within a framework of national security (as reflected in the 'national security 
state'), of national welfare (as reflected in social democratic welfare states), or some 
other national matrix. 
 
The tendential ecological dominance of the capitalist economy does not mean that 
its influence on other systems and the lifeworld is unilateral and uniform. It is, on the 
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contrary, asymmetrical and variable. The political system, which is currently 
materialized above all in the institutional architectures of national states and 
international relations and linked to the lifeworld through public opinion, also has 
important reciprocal influences on the development of the capitalist economy. Indeed 
it poses the biggest challenge to the latter's ecological dominance. For, whilst the 
state system is responsible for securing certain key conditions for the valorization of 
capital and the social reproduction of labour power as a fictitious commodity, it also 
has overall political responsibility for maintaining social cohesion in a socially 
divided, pluralistic social formation. The always-problematic relationship between 
these functions generates risks and uncertainties for capital accumulation as does 
state failure in either regard. This is why there is typically a strong structural coupling 
and co-evolution between the economic and the political in accumulation regimes 
and their modes of regulation. It is also why struggles over political power are so 
crucial to the reproduction-régulation of capital accumulation and why the state is so 
central to securing the spatio-temporal fixes in and through which relatively stable 
accumulation becomes possible. And it is why globalization, especially in its neo-
liberal form, represents such a challenge to the actually existing institutional 
architecture of the political system. For it tends to weaken the typical form of the 
national state in advanced capitalist societies as this developed during the period of 
Atlantic Fordism and to disrupt the spatio-temporal fixes around which both 
accumulation and the state were organized. These issues are elaborated later.  
 
Other systems are typically less likely to attain the relative ecological dominance of 
the political system, let alone that of a globalizing economy, as they depend more on 
the performances of the political and economic systems than the latter do on them. 
Nonetheless, even though the relations between operationally autonomous but 
substantively interdependent systems may be more or less strongly asymmetrical, 
there will always be structural coupling and co-evolution among them. This can be 
explained through the usual trio of evolutionary mechanisms: variation, selection, 
and retention (Campbell 1969). Variation in activities in each system will prove more 
or less perturbing to the self-organization of other systems. Thus, where 
operationally autonomous but interdependent systems share the same social space, 
their development tends to become structurally coupled through mutual adaptation to 
the changes in their environment generated by the operations of the other systems – 
 16
adaptations which are governed by each system's own operational code or 
organizational logic. If a particular pattern of interaction reveals a damaging 
incongruence in mutual expectations, it will either be suspended or expectations will 
be varied. Those variations will get co-selected that least interfere with the distinctive 
autopoiesis of the different interacting systems and they will then be co-retained as 
these selections become suitably sedimented in the programmes, organizational 
intelligence, strategic capacities and moral economies of the various co-existing 
systems. Although attempts are often made to co-ordinate or steer co-evolution in 
social systems, no consensus is needed for this sedimentation to occur. Indeed, it 
would be impossible to guide such a complex process – any attempts at design are 
always located within broader processes of blind co-evolution. All that is necessary 
for such sedimentation to occur is a long-run congruence between individual system 
autopoiesis and inter-systemic interaction.  
 
The relevance of these general evolutionary arguments to capitalist development 
becomes clear as soon as one recalls that the capital relation cannot be reproduced 
exclusively through the value form. For it is asymmetrically interdependent on other 
systems and the lifeworld for key inputs to help secure closure of the circuit of capital 
and for compensation for market failures. Thus, outside a wholly imaginary 'pure 
capitalist economy' (on which, see Albritton 1986), capitalism is 'structurally coupled' 
to other systems and to the 'lifeworld'. The former include the legal and political 
systems, which provide important extra-economic conditions for accumulation even 
in liberal, competitive capitalism; but which are nonetheless operationally 
autonomous from the capitalist market economy and have their own instrumental 
rationalities, logics of appropriateness, and institutional dynamics. They also include 
other self-organizing (or autopoietic) systems with their own mutually distinctive 
codes, rationalities, logics, and dynamics, such as education, science, medicine, 
sport, art, and religion. All such systems constitute environments for the self-
valorization of capital, providing final markets as well as inputs. The 'lifeworld' in turn 
comprises various social relations, identities, interests, and values that stand outside 
and/or cut across specific systems rather than being anchored in them.15 It includes 
                                            
15  I extend the system world well beyond Habermas's couplet of economy and state 
to include any self-organizing system with its own instrumental rationality and 
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social relations such as gender, generation, ethnicity, national identity, generation, 
associational memberships, new social movements, and so forth. These influence 
affect the economy by shaping opportunities for profit as well as influencing struggles 
over commodification, de-commodification, and re-commodification of the wider 
society. This can be illustrated through such phenomena as the gendered division of 
labour; dual labour markets structured around generational and ethnic divisions; the 
development of markets oriented to the 'pink pound'; concerns about regional, urban, 
and national competitiveness; or the impact of green movements on strategies for 
ecological modernization.  
 
This implies that the development of the capitalist (market) economy is closely bound 
up with non-economic factors and that it never follows a purely economic logic. Its 
development is always overdetermined by its coupling to other systems and the 
lifeworld. Seen in these terms, the development of the capitalist economy is 
embedded in a wider nexus of social relations and institutions and the lifeworld; its 
evolution is linked to environing, embedding institutions and the activities of wider 
social forces; and these institutions and forces may either help or hinder its overall 
reproduction, regularization, and governance. Thus accumulation regimes are 
usually associated with modes of regulation that regularize the extra-economic as 
well as the economic conditions required for their expanded reproduction and that 
require the cooperation of extra-economic forces. This structural coupling develops 
in the first instance through co-adaptation among the economic, political, and other 
systems. Such blind co-evolution can generate an 'historical bloc', i.e., an historically 
constituted and socially reproduced correspondence between the so-called 
'economic base' and 'politico-ideological' superstructures of a social formation. 
Moreover, insofar as it is the economy that is ecologically dominant, the historical 
bloc acquires an apparent 'base-superstructure' pattern conforming to economic 
determinist predictions. Yet this can be explained in blind co-evolutionary terms 
without the need to resort to the notorious principle of economic determination in the 
last instance understood as a unilinear, unilateral, and uniform causal relationship 
(cf. Jessop 1990a: 358-9).  
                                                                                                                                        
interpret the ‘lifeworld' more widely to include identity politics, etc., regardless of 
whether committed or not to undistorted communication. 
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 Strategic Co-ordination, Governance, and Meta-Steering 
 
Whereas 'structural coupling' refers to the formal and substantive articulation of 
different structures treated as autonomous structures, 'strategic co-ordination' refers 
to the strategic dimension of co-evolution from the viewpoint of specific social forces. 
The same systems theory that provides the idea of ecological dominance also offers 
key insights into the nature and limits of steering as applied to autopoietic systems. It 
explores how one operationally autonomous system can influence the operations of 
another such (relatively closed) system by altering the environment in which the 
latter reproduces itself and also examines how governance mechanisms might 
shape their joint evolution. This is especially relevant to the path-shaping efforts of 
economic, political, and other social forces to influence, steer, or govern the nature 
and direction of their co-evolution.  
 
The evolution of the economy on a world scale is essentially anarchic and its 
relationship to other systems and the lifeworld is characterized by blind co-evolution 
based on post hoc structural coupling. Nonetheless, there is limited and localized 
scope for steering economic development and co-ordinating activities across the 
economic and extra-economic divide. Such activities can occur on different levels: 
interpersonal, inter-organizational, and inter-systemic. Such path-shaping efforts are 
mediated through subjects who attempt to engage in ex ante self-regulatory strategic 
co-ordination, monitor the effects of that co-ordination on goal attainment, and 
modify their strategies as appropriate. In this way cooperation among actors from 
different systems will follow from application of their own system's operating codes in 
changed circumstances rather than from an externally imposed imperative co-
ordination (see Glagow and Willke 1987; Willke 1992; Willke 1996). This can be 
facilitated by communication oriented to intersystemic 'noise reduction' (promoting 
mutual understanding among different systems), negotiation, negative co-ordination 
(mutual respect for the operational codes of other systems and attempts to avoid 
negative impacts on these systems), and cooperation in shared projects. It can also 
resort to symbolic media of communication such as money, law, or knowledge to 
modify the structural and/or strategic contexts in which different systems function. 
Such media play a crucial role in mediating the relations between operationally 
 19
autonomous but substantively interdependent systems. For example, the economy 
depends on coercion (e.g., to secure property rights) which is not produced within 
the economy; the polity depends in turn on revenues (in the form of taxes) generated 
in the economy. Money and law provide crucial mediations between these two 
orders: money appears as a fictitious commodity in the economy, as taxation and 
public spending in the political system; law appears as property rights in the 
economy, as legal rights in the political system. Money and law also serve as 
regulatory devices to bridge relations between economics and politics. Thus money 
connects the productive and administrative economies and circulates between them; 
and law mediates between civil and political society. In this sense money and law 
stand at the centre of an indissolubly mixed public-private space – they belong to 
both the public and private spheres, they must be valid within both the political and 
economic spheres, and they mediate between them (Théret 1991: 134-145).  
 
Since the structure of the social world is always more complex than any social force 
can conceive and its overall evolution lies beyond the control of any social force, 
strategic co-ordination can only occur in the context of the uncontrolled and anarchic 
coupling of co-evolving structures and systems. Indeed, autopoietic systems theory 
also teaches us that such attempts at strategic co-ordination can never fully 
represent the operational logic (let alone fully comprehend the current conjuncture 
and future direction) of whole subsystems; and that the development of such 
mechanisms of co-ordination adds further layers of complexity to the social world. It 
thereby risks adding governance failure to market failure and state failure as 
problems to be confronted, if only through their unforeseen and/or unintended 
consequences and side-effects. This raises the issue of whether meta-steering might 
be possible, i.e., the use of higher-order mechanisms to collibrate different modes of 
steering (markets, states and other forms of imperative co-ordination, networks).16 
But the same arguments that indicate the probability of steering failure apply with 
equal force to meta-steering failure (see Jessop 1998). 
                                            
16  My earlier work referred to 'meta-steering' as 'meta-governance'. But the latter is 
ambiguous because 'governance' refers both to all forms of co-ordinating complex 
reciprocal interdependence and to just one of these forms, i.e., self-organization 
or heterarchy. 'Meta-steering' avoids this ambiguity. 
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These ideas have important implications for accumulation strategies, state projects, 
and hegemonic projects on various scales of action and over different time horizons. 
For these all represent different attempts to strategically co-ordinate activities across 
different systems and the lifeworld in order to achieve a limited, localized structural 
coherence in accumulation, state activities, and social formations respectively. 
Armed with these general arguments, I now consider: (a) the structural coupling and 
strategic co-ordination of capital accumulation and modes of regulation within 
specific spatio-temporal horizons; and (b) the role of these spatio-temporal fixes in 
facilitating the displacement and/or deferral of the contradictions and dilemmas of 
capital accumulation. 
 
On Spatio-Temporal Fixes 
 
Reproducing and regularizing capitalism involves a 'social fix' that partially 
compensates for the incompleteness of the pure capital relation and gives it a 
specific dynamic through the articulation of its economic and extra-economic 
elements. This helps to secure a relatively durable pattern of structural coherence in 
the handling of the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in the capital relation. One 
necessary aspect of this social fix is the imposition of a 'spatio-temporal fix' on these 
economic and extra-economic elements. It achieves this by establishing spatial and 
temporal boundaries within which the relative structural coherence is secured and by 
externalizing certain costs of securing this coherence beyond these boundaries. 
Even within these boundaries we typically find that some classes, class fractions, 
social categories, or other social forces located within these spatio-temporal 
boundaries are marginalized, excluded, or subject to coercion.  
 
The primary scales and temporal horizons around which these fixes are constructed 
and the extent of their coherence vary considerably over time. This is reflected in the 
variable coincidence of different boundaries, borders, or frontiers of scales of action 
(e.g., medieval polymorphy, Westphalian exclusivity, post-Westphalian complexity), 
the changing primacy of different scales (e.g., the displacement of the urban scale by 
the national territorial scale with the emergence of capitalism and the integration of 
cities into national economic systems and their subordination to the political power of 
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states or the recent emergence of global city networks more oriented to other global 
cities than to national hinterlands) (cf. Braudel 1983; Taylor 1995a,b; Brenner 1998). 
In this context, then, it is worth enquiring after the implications of globalization for 
spatio-temporal fixes.  
 
Spatio-temporal fixes have both strategic and structural dimensions. Strategically, 
since the contradictions and dilemmas are insoluble in the abstract, they can only be 
resolved – partially and provisionally at best – through the formulation-realization of 
specific accumulation strategies in specific spatio-temporal contexts (Jessop 1983). 
These strategies seek to resolve conflicts between the needs of 'capital in general' 
and particular capitals by constructing an imagined 'general interest' that will 
necessarily marginalize some capitalist interests. Interests are not only relational but 
also relative, i.e., one has interests in relation to others and relative to different 
spatial and temporal horizons. The general interest thus delimits the identities and 
relations relative to which calculation of interests occurs; and it confines the spatial 
and temporal horizons within which this occurs. It involves specific notions about 
which identities and interests can be synthesized within a general interest, about the 
intertemporal articulation of different time horizons (short-, medium-, and long-term, 
business cycle, electoral cycle, long wave, etc.), and about the relative importance of 
different spatial and/or scalar horizons (local, regional, national, supranational, etc.). 
Thus a conception of the general interest privileges some identities, interests, and 
spatio-temporal horizons and marginalizes or sanctions others. It also refers to what 
is needed to secure an institutionalized class compromise and to address wider 
problems of social cohesion. Such success is often secured only through a trial-and-
error search that reveals the requirements of 'capital in general' more through 
repeated failure than sustained success (Clarke 1977; Jessop 1983, 1999b). In 
establishing this general interest and institutionalized compromise, however, 
accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects typically displace and defer their 
material and social costs beyond the social, spatial, and temporal boundaries of that 
compromise. This can involve super-exploitation of internal or external spaces 
outside the compromise, super-exploitation of nature or inherited social resources, 
deferral of problems into an indefinite future, and, of course, the exploitation and/or 
oppression of specific classes or other social categories.  
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Different scales of action and different temporal horizons may be used in a given 
spatio-temporal fix to handle different aspects of capital's structural contradictions 
and/or horns of resulting strategic dilemmas. For example, in Atlantic Fordism, the 
national state set the macro-economic framework, the local state acted as its relay, 
and intergovernmental cooperation maintained the conditions for national economic 
growth. Likewise, in contemporary neo-liberal accumulation regimes, the neo-liberal 
state's relative neglect of substantive (as opposed to formal) supply-side conditions 
at the international and national levels is partly compensated by more interventionist 
policies at the regional, urban, and local levels (Gough and Eisenschitz 1996; 
Brenner 1997). In addition, the withdrawal of the state is compensated by capital's 
increasing resort on all levels to networking and other forms of public-private 
partnership to secure its reproduction requirements. Another illustration of spatial-
scalar divisions of labour is the tendential dissolution of the distinction between 
foreign and domestic relations. State organization is premised on a distinction 
between nation states; and, in this context, some parts of the state apparatus 
specialize in external relations, some in internal relations. However, with the growing 
impact of globalization and new forms of competitiveness, inherited divisions of state 
labour have changed. Not only is the distinction between domestic and foreign policy 
becoming blurred but we also find sub-national governments engaging in foreign 
(economic) policy through cross-border cooperation, international localization, etc..  
 
There can also be a temporal division of labour with different institutions, 
apparatuses, or agencies responding to contradictions, dilemmas, and paradoxes 
over different time horizons. For example, whereas finance ministries deal with 
annual budgets, industry ministries would assume responsibility for longer term 
restructuring. Similarly, corporatist arrangements have often been introduced to 
address long-term economic and social issues where complex, reciprocal 
interdependence requires long-term cooperation – thereby taking the relevant policy 
areas outside the short-term time horizons of electoral cycles and parliamentary in-
fighting. In both cases there is also scope for meta-steering to re-balance the 
relations among these institutions, apparatuses, or agencies through a differential 




Governance has a key role here in modulating the scalar and spatial divisions of 
labour and allocating specific tasks to different sites of action. This may be triggered 
by changes in the unstable equilibrium of compromise around which accumulation is 
organized. The neglect of key economic and/or extra-economic conditions for 
accumulation generates increasing tensions to give them greater priority. These 
tensions may be evident from the emergence of crises and/or from the mobilization 
of social forces whose support is critical to accumulation but whose interests are 
affected adversely by this neglect (Clarke 1977). Meta-steering enters here as a 
means to collibrate different governance mechanisms and modify their relative 
importance. Collibration is concerned with the overall organization and balancing of 
the different forms of co-ordination of complex reciprocal interdependence (Dunsire 
1996). In addition to meta-steering practices within the more or less separate fields 
of anarchic market exchange, hierarchical organizations, and heterarchic self-
organization, there is also extensive scope for meta-governance practices that steer 
the evolving relationship among these different modes of co-ordination. The need for 
such practices is especially acute in the light of the wide dispersion of governance 
mechanisms in an emerging world society and the corresponding need to build 
appropriate macro-organizational and intersystemic capacities to address far-
reaching increases in the complexity of interdependencies without undermining the 
basic coherence and integrity of the (national) state.  
 
The concept of spatio-temporal fix proposed here differs from David Harvey's notion 
of spatial fix in at least three respects. First, in attempting to redress what he regards 
as the exaggerated concern with time in earlier Marxist dialectical accounts, Harvey 
tends to focus one-sidedly on spatial fixes. But there is a close connection between 
spatiality and temporality in securing the relative structural coherence of capital 
accumulation. This holds not only in the trite sense that space and time are so 
inextricably interwoven that space cannot be seen as static, nor time as spaceless 
(Massey 1992: 77, 80); but also in the sense that these fixes involve the construction 
of specific time-space envelopes (or power geometries) that are based on differential 
articulations of time-space distantiation and time-space compression (Massey 1992; 
Sum 1999; Jessop 1999a,b).  
 
Second, Harvey examines spatial fixes primarily in terms of just one of the many 
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contradictions of capital accumulation, namely, that between productive capital as 
abstract value in motion (notably in the form of realized profits available for re-
investment) and as a concrete stock of time- and place-specific assets in the course 
of being valorized. He analyses two aspects of this: (a) the impulsion to accelerate 
turnover time, to speed up the circulation of capital and, hence, to revolutionize the 
time horizons of economic development – all of which requires, however, long-term 
infrastructural investment; and (b) the pressure to eliminate all spatial barriers to 
accumulation, to 'annihilate space through time' – which requires the production of a 
fixed space. Although Harvey refers to problems of temporality in regard to both 
aspects,17 the capitalist solution he identifies is spatial. In particular he focuses on 
the production of localized geographical landscapes of long-term infrastructural 
investments that facilitate the turnover time of industrial capital and the circulation of 
commercial and financial capital. Later these landscapes (of place relations, 
territorial organization, and inter-linked places) will need to be destroyed and rebuilt 
to accommodate a new dynamic of accumulation (Harvey: 1996, 6). This analysis is 
certainly important and insightful. But each of the different contradictions of capital 
accumulation has its own spatio-temporal aspects and associated dilemmas. A 
coherent spatio-temporal fix must reflect all aspects.  
 
And, third, Harvey does not address the different forms of spatio-temporal fix in 
relation to different stages or forms of capital accumulation nor their articulation to 
institutionalized class compromise or modes of regulation. His is a general model 
that is illustrated from different stages of capitalism but does not actually distinguish 
different scales or temporal horizons as more or less important in particular periods 
or forms of capitalism. This does not mean that it cannot be adapted to take account 
of these issues – merely that it remains for this to be done.  
 
Atlantic Fordism and The KWNS 
                                            
17 Concerning aspect (a) of this contradiction, Harvey does distinguish the temporal 
horizons of different fractions of capital (e.g., currency and bond markets, money 
and finance vs productive capitals, land speculators and developers) and note the 
stresses produced by the temporal compression powers of financial capital (1996: 
6). But he nonetheless focuses more on aspect (b) and its distinctive spatial fix. 
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 No accumulation strategy can ever be completely coherent or fully institutionalized. 
This is due both to the opacity and indeterminacy of the conditions necessary to 
capital accumulation; and to the need to develop and build support for the strategy in 
and across conflictual fields of competing strategies associated with other social 
forces. Nonetheless, insofar as one accumulation strategy becomes dominant or 
hegemonic and is institutionalized within a specific spatio-temporal fix, it will facilitate 
the consolidation of an accumulation regime within the economic space linked to this 
fix. Because the underlying contradictions and dilemmas still exist, however, any 
such regimes are always partial, provisional, and unstable. The circuit of capital can 
still break at many points. Economic crises then serve to re-impose the always-
relative unity of the circuit of capital through various kinds of restructuring. If these 
are compatible with the prevailing accumulation regime, growth will be renewed 
within its parameters. If not, a crisis of  – and not just in – the accumulation regime 
will develop, provoking the search for new strategies, new institutionalized 
compromises, and new spatio-temporal fixes. 
 
In the so-called 'thirty glorious years' of post-war expansion in advanced capitalist 
economies, the national scale of economic organization dominated. National 
economies were the taken-for-granted objects of economic management. This can 
be seen not only in the circuits of Atlantic Fordism but also in the so-called 
mercantilist regimes or 'trading nations' of East Asia and the import-substitution 
accumulation strategies of many Latin American economies. While international 
institutions and regimes were organized to rescue European nation-states and to 
ensure national economic growth, for example, their sub-national (regional or local) 
states acted primarily as the relays of national policy. This 'naturalization' of the 
national economy and national state was linked (within Atlantic Fordism) to the 
relative closure of post-war economies undergoing reconstruction on the basis of 
mass production and mass consumption. In several East Asian economies, the 
same effect was achieved through 'national security' discourses that connected the 
nation's internal and/or external security to close control over the domestic economy.  
 
These claims can be illustrated with some brief comments on accumulation regimes 
and modes of regulation in those economic spaces directly integrated into the 
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circuits of Atlantic Fordism under US hegemony. These comments concern the 
structural coherence of this system, the factors leading to its breakdown, and the 
scope the latter offers for a coherent post-Fordism. Such issues cannot be theorized 
without starting from contradictions inscribed in capital's various structural forms and 
their associated strategic dilemmas. 
 
Atlantic Fordism can be briefly defined as an accumulation regime based on a 
virtuous autocentric circle of mass production and mass consumption secured 
through a distinctive mode of regulation that was institutionally and practically 
materialized in the Keynesian welfare national state (hereafter KWNS – for more 
details, see Jessop 1993, 1994, 1999c). My interest here is in the limits of the KWNS 
as a mode of regulation. This made its distinctive contribution to the Atlantic Fordist 
regime by managing, at least for a while, the contradictions in the different forms of 
the capital relation. The Atlantic Fordist economies benefitted from a spatio-territorial 
matrix based on the congruence between national economy, national state, national 
citizenship, and national society; and from institutions relatively well adapted to 
combining the tasks of securing full employment and economic growth and 
managing national electoral cycles. This spatio-temporal fix enabled a specific 
resolution of the contradictions of capital accumulation as they were expressed 
under Atlantic Fordism. Thus, within relatively closed national economies which had 
been institutionally-discursively constituted as the primary objects of economic 
management, national states aimed to achieve full employment by treating wages 
primarily as a source of (domestic) demand and managed their budgets on the 
assumption that money circulated primarily as national money. The diffusion of mass 
production (and its economies of scale) through expanding Fordist firms as well as 
the development of collective bargaining indexed to productivity and prices were the 
primary means for controlling wages as a cost of production. And the combination of 
the Bretton Woods monetary regime and the GATT trade regime helped ensure that 
the (still limited) circulation of free-floating international currencies did not seriously 
disturb Keynesian economic management through state control over the national 
money. Welfare rights based on national citizenship helped to generalize norms of 
mass consumption and thereby contributed to full employment levels of demand; and 
they were sustained in turn by an institutionalized compromise involving Fordist 
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unions and Fordist firms. Securing full employment and extending welfare rights 
were in turn important axes of party political competition.  
 
Some costs of the Fordist compromise and the KWNS were borne within Fordist 
societies themselves by the relative decline of small and medium firms, by workers 
employed in disadvantaged parts of segmented labour markets, and by women 
subject to the dual burden of paid and domestic labour. Other costs were borne 
beyond Fordist societies by economic and political spaces that were integrated into 
international regimes (such as those for cheap oil or migrant labour) necessary to 
Atlantic Fordism's continued growth but that were not included within the Fordist 
compromise. Atlantic Fordism was also enabled through a Janus-faced temporal fix. 
On the one hand, it depended on the rapid exploitation of non-renewable resources 
laid down over millennia (notably the 'subterranean forest' of fossil fuels as well as 
raw materials); and, on the other hand, it produced environmental pollution and 
social problems that it did not address within its own temporal horizons – as if 
working on the principle of après moi, la déluge (see, for example, Altvater 1993, 
247-278; Brennan 1995; Stahel 1999). 
 
Crises in and of Fordism are inevitably overdetermined. The typical manifestation of 
the crisis in Fordism was an increasing tendency towards stagflation – which 
reflected the distinctive grounding of its mode of regulation in the wage and money 
forms. But this crisis-tendency was usually overcome through a combination of 
crisis-induced economic restructuring and incremental institutional changes. The 
crisis of Fordism was manifested in the breakdown of these crisis-management 
mechanisms. A major contributing factor in this regard was the undermining of the 
national economy as an object of state management – notably through the 
internationalization of trade, investment, and finance and other features ascribed to 
globalization. This led to a shift in the primary aspects of its two main contradictions 
and gave renewed force to other familiar expressions of the underlying 
contradictions of capitalism. Thus the wage (both individual and social) came 
increasingly to be seen as an international cost of production rather than as a source 
of domestic demand; and money has increasingly come to circulate as an 
international currency and has thereby weakened Keynesian economic demand 
management on a national level. This shift in the primary aspect of the contradiction 
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in the money form is related to the tendency for the dynamic of industrial capital to 
be subordinated to the hypermobile logic of financial capital and the tendency for 
returns on money capital to exceed those on productive capital. At the same time the 
relative exhaustion of the Atlantic Fordist growth dynamic posed problems of 
productivity growth and market saturation (which combine to intensify an emerging 
fiscal crisis of the state) and problems of how best to manage the transition to the 
next long wave of economic expansion (which entails changes in the temporal 
horizons of state economic intervention and thus in the forms and mechanisms of 
such intervention). The crisis of US hegemony is also reflected in struggles over the 
shaping of new international regimes and the extent to which they should serve 
particular American interests rather than the interests of capitalism more generally.18 
In addition, new conflicts and/or forms of struggle have emerged that cannot be 
stabilized within existing structural forms: two major examples are the rise of new 
social movements and the crisis of corporatism. New problems have also emerged, 
such as pollution and new categories of risk, which are not easily managed, 
regularized, or governed within the old forms. Finally, we should note that, relative to 
the growth phase of Atlantic Fordism, some contradictions have increased in 




This section considers the implications of globalization for the increasing ecological 
dominance of capitalism. The over-inflated, catchall quality of the word 'globalization' 
tends to increase rather than reduce the confusion about current tendencies and 
trends in capitalism and the wider world. My own view is that globalization is, in 
general, best interpreted as the complex resultant of many different processes rather 
than as a distinctive causal process in its own right. It is misleading to explain 
specific events and phenomena in terms of some general process of 'globalization'. If 
adequately re-specified, however, trends towards globalization can certainly help to 
situate and interpret current changes in the spatial scale of economic (and other 
types of) institutions, organizations, and strategies. Indeed, although there are 
                                            
18 In contrast the new postwar international regimes established under American 
hegemony served broader interests in capital accumulation.  
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certainly discernible trends towards globalization, they are inevitably linked closely 
and in complex ways to processes occurring on other spatial scales. Whilst the trend 
towards global economic integration is promoted through structural trends and 
explicit strategies on less inclusive spatial scales, the latter are also important sites 
of counter-tendencies and resistance to globalization. 
 
Globalization has both structural and strategic moments. Structurally, it involves the 
processes whereby increasing global interdependence is created among actions, 
organizations, and institutions within (but not necessarily across) different functional 
subsystems (economy, law, politics, education, science, sport, etc.). These 
processes occur on various spatial scales, operate differently in each functional 
subsystem, involve complex and tangled causal hierarchies rather than a simple, 
unilinear, bottom-up or top-down movement, and often display an eccentric 'nesting' 
of the different scales of social organization. This implies in turn, of course, that 
globalization is liable to uneven development in spatio-temporal terms. Nonetheless, 
globalization can be said to increase insofar as the co-variation of relevant activities 
is spatially more extensive and/or occurs more rapidly. For globalization involves 
both 'time-space distantiation' and 'time-space compression'. The former process 
involves the stretching of social relations over time and space so that relations can 
be controlled or co-ordinated over longer periods of time (including into the ever 
more distant future) and over longer distances, greater areas, or more scales of 
activity. In this regard globalization is a result of increasing spatial distantiation 
reflected in the increasing spatial reach of divisions of labour in different fields of 
activity and is made possible by new material and social technologies of 
transportation, communication, command, control, and intelligence. Time-space 
compression involves the intensification of 'discrete' events in real time and/or the 
increased velocity of material and immaterial flows over a given distance. This is 
linked to changing material and social technologies enabling more precise control 
over ever-shorter periods of action as well as 'the conquest of space by time'. 
Combined with time-space distantiation, differential abilities to compress time and 
space become major bases of power and resistance in the emerging global order. 
Thus the power of hypermobile forms of finance capital depends on their unique 
capacity to compress their own decision-making time (e.g., through split-second 
computerized trading) whilst continuing to extend and consolidate their global reach. 
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It also poses serious problems for global governance insofar as this must be tackled 
across a range of potentially contradictory temporal and spatial horizons. This brings 
us to the strategic dimension of globalization. 
 
Strategically, globalization refers to various actors' attempts to promote global co-
ordination of activities in (but not necessarily across) different functional subsystems 
and/or the lifeworld. This does not require that the actors involved are physically 
present at all points in the globe, of course; all it requires is that they attempt to co-
ordinate their activities with others in order to produce global effects. The latter can 
range from meta-steering (constitutional or institutional design) for a more or less 
comprehensive global order to the pursuit of specific economic-corporate interests 
within such a meta-framework. Among the most ambitious global projects one could 
include projects for world government, global governance, or a new world order. 
There is clearly scope for wide variation in such projects as evidenced by the neo-
liberal, market-led globalization favoured by the World Bank, the horizontal 'global 
governance' favoured by proponents (especially NGOs) of international regimes, and 
plans for more top-down inter-statal government. Less ambitious but still global 
projects might range from attempts to establish 'international regimes' to govern 
particular fields of action on a global scale through strategic alliances orchestrated 
by transnational enterprises (alliances which may include more local or regionally-
based firms as well as non-profit-oriented organizations) or cooperation among 
global cities to consolidate their dominance in the hierarchy of global cities down to 
the efforts of individual firms to consolidate a dominant or even a niche position 
within the international division of labour and/or circulation of goods and services. 
Forms of co-ordination involved in globalization can also vary widely – ranging from 
intersystemic co-ordination in major world forums through inter-organizational 
negotiation (e.g., strategic alliances) to interpersonal networking (e.g., the Chinese 
diaspora). Given the importance of the path-dependent contexts of such path-
shaping activities as well as the inherent limitations of any attempt to steer the 
structural coupling and co-evolution of operationally autonomous but substantively 
interdependent systems, there is every likelihood that such projects will be more or 




Thus viewed, what is generally labelled nowadays as 'economic globalization' rarely, 
if ever, involves full structural integration and strategic co-ordination across the 
globe. Processes included under this rubric actually include: (a) internationalization 
of national economic spaces through growing penetration (inward flows) and 
extraversion (outward flows); (b) formation of regional economic blocs embracing 
several national economies – including, most notably, the formation of various 
formally organized blocs in the triadic regions of North America, Europe, and East 
Asia – and the development of formal links between these blocs – notably through 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the New Transatlantic Agenda, and 
the Asia-Europe Meetings; (c) growth of more 'local internationalization' or 'virtual 
regions' through the development of economic ties between contiguous or non-
contiguous local and regional authorities in different national economies – ties that 
often by-pass the level of the national state but may also be sponsored by the latter; 
(d) extension and deepening of multinationalization as multinational companies and 
transnational banks move from limited economic activities abroad to more 
comprehensive and worldwide strategies, sometimes extending to 'global 
localization' whereby firms pursue a global strategy based on exploiting and/or 
adjusting to local differences; (e) widening and deepening of international regimes 
covering economic and economically relevant issues; and (f) emergence of 
globalization proper through the introduction and acceptance of global norms and 
standards, the development of globally integrated markets together with globally 
oriented strategies, and 'deracinated' firms with no evident national operational base. 
In each case these processes could be said to be contributing in however mediated 
and indirect a way to the structural integration and strategic co-ordination of the 
capitalist economy on a global scale. But they do so in a dispersed, fragmented, and 
partial manner and they are far from producing an homogenized world economy 
marked by the absence of uneven spatio-temporal development. 
 
Thus economic globalization clearly involves a combination of processes on many 
different scales and is certainly far from being a purely 'global' phenomenon. Indeed, 
as Budd (1992) notes, ‘the global cannot abolish the local'. Instead what 
globalization involves in both its structural and strategic moments is the creation 
and/or restructuring of scale as a social relation and as a site of social relations. This 
is evident in the continuing (if often transformed) significance of smaller scales 
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(notably the urban, the cross-border, the national, and macro-regional) as 
substantive sites of real economic activities; in economic strategies oriented to the 
articulation of other scales into the global – such as glocalization, 'glurbanization',19 
international localization, and so forth; and in new social movements based on 
localism, various 'tribalisms', or resurgent nationalism and resistant in different ways 
to globalization. This suggests in turn that what can be described from one 
perspective as globalization could equally well be described from other perspectives 
in terms of changing forms of triadization, regionalization, urbanization, and so on. 
None of these processes is confined to one scale: they are all multi-scalar, multi-
temporal, and multi-centric. This implies that a global strategy should be sensitive to 
other scales than the 'purely' global – especially as the latter has social meaning only 
in relation to lesser scales. Indeed the global more often serves as the ultimate 
horizon of action rather than the actual site of action, i.e., as an ultimate horizon of 
action, it serves as a means to orient actions on lesser scales! This is not an 
insignificant role. For failure to take strategic account of the global, even if actions 
remain confined to other scales, could well lead to a more or less rapid loss of 
competitiveness. 
 
Globalization is part of a proliferation of scales as institutionalized, narrated objects 
of action, regularization, and governance. The number of discrete scales of action 
that can be distinguished is potentially infinite but far fewer scales actually come to 
be institutionalized as explicit objects of regularization and governance. For this 
depends on the availability of specific technologies of power – material, social, and 
spatio-temporal – that transform potential scales of action into actual sites of action. 
In addition to logistical means (distantiation, compression, virtual communication), 
there are modes of governance, organizational technologies, and institutional 
architectures. In this context I suggest that economically and politically significant 
institutionalized scales of action have proliferated due to the development of new 
technologies, organizations, and institutions with new spatio-temporal horizons of 
                                            
19 Whereas 'glocalization' is a strategy pursued by global firms that seek to exploit 
local differences to enhance their global operations, 'glurbanization' is pursued by 
cities to enhance their place-based dynamic competitive advantages in order to 
capture certain types of mobile capital and/or to fix local capital in place. 
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action. Moreover, as new scales emerge and/or existing scales gain in institutional 
thickness, new mechanisms to link or co-ordinate them also tend to emerge. This in 
turn often prompts efforts to co-ordinate these new co-ordination mechanisms. Thus, 
as the triad regions begin to acquire institutional form and regional identity, new 
forums have developed to co-ordinating bilateral relations between them. In the 
wake of the North American Free Trade Area, the European Union, and an emerging 
East Asian economic region, for example, we can witness the emergence of the 
Transatlantic Dialogue, the Asia-Europe Meetings, and Asian-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation. Likewise, as regionalism develops within the European Union, we find 
not only an EU wide committee of the regions but also a proliferation of other peak 
associations and multi-lateral linkages among regions. Yet lower down the scale, 
local authorities develop national associations to represent their interests at national, 
regional, international, and global levels. All of this produces increasing scalar 
complexity, increasing scope for deliberate interscalar articulation, and increasing 
problems in making such interscalar articulation work.  
 
A similar process is at work regarding temporal horizons of action. New information, 
communication, logistical, and organizational technologies have enhanced the 
capacities of some actors to engage in time-space compression and this has helped 
to transform power relations within and across different systems and the lifeworld. 
Time-space compression contributes to globalization through the increased 
capacities it offers for time-space distantiation. It also reinforces the ecological 
dominance of the market economy by enhancing the opportunities for some 
economic agents to intensify the exchange-value moment of the capital relation at 
the expense of the use-value moment; and for others to respond to this by moving to 
just-in-time production and fast service to their markets (see Sum 1999). Trends 
towards time-space compression are also accompanied by growing recognition of 
longer-term temporal horizons up to the longue durée of environmental damage – 
although globalization is also associated with its acceleration. These developments 
pose problems of inter-temporal comparisons and calculation as well as inter-
temporal co-ordination; and these call for more complex forms of organization and 
co-ordination – which thereby increase the complexity of the system as a whole.  
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Thus, far from producing an homogenized global economic space, processes 
involved in globalization actually involve the re-ordering – across a wide range of 
economic spaces on different spatial scales – of differences and complementarities 
as the basis for dynamic competitive advantages. This has both structural aspects 
linked to the structural coupling and co-evolution of different spaces within an 
emerging global division of labour and its eccentric, nested, sub-scales; and strategic 
aspects, with different actors looking for the best means of inserting themselves into 
the spatial, scalar, and temporal divisions of labour. In this context not all actors are 
(or could hope to be) major global players but an increasing number need to attend 
to the global as a horizon of action, to the implications of changing scalar divisions, 
and to the differential impact of time-space distantiation and compression on their 
identities, interests, and strategies. The implications of this for economic, political, 
and social action were anticipated by Henri Lefebvre in his argument that 'the 
viability of all strategies of capital accumulation, modes of state regulation and forms 
of socio-political mobilization has come to depend crucially upon the ability to 
produce, appropriate, organize, restructure and control social space' (Lefebvre 1972, 
cited Brenner 1997: 1). We need only to add that it is not merely the ability to 
produce, appropriate, organize, restructure and control social space that is at stake 
here but also the ability to do likewise in relation to the temporalities of social action. 
 
The Relativization of Scale 
 
This emphasis on the articulation of scales brings us to a key aspect of the current 
round of globalization – the relativization of scale. The crisis of Atlantic Fordism with 
its primacy of the national scale has disrupted the mutuality between cities and 
territorial states characteristic of Atlantic Fordism (Taylor 1995a,b); it has also 
disturbed the nested relationship between local, regional, and national governments. 
Similar problems are found in economies outside the former heartlands of Atlantic 
Fordism, its semi-peripheries in Southern Europe, or more peripheral regions that 
served as its production platforms. Thus there is a more general (indeed, global) 
problem today about the relative importance to be accorded to global, national, and 
so-called 'regional' sites and spaces of economic action.  
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As economic internationalization and globalization proceeded, the taken-for-
grantedness of national economic space has been called into question as national 
economies became more crisis-prone and unmanageable through traditional forms 
of state intervention in a mixed economy. States could no longer act as if national 
economies were more or less closed and their growth dynamics were primarily 
domestic. This has undermined the national economy as an object of economic 
management and led to quite different conceptions of the economy and, a fortiori, its 
mechanisms of economic and social governance. Replacing the national economy 
as the primary object of economic governance is the knowledge-driven economy in 
an era of globalization (Castells 1996). Its growth dynamic depends on how 
effectively a given economic space – not necessarily a national economy – is 
inserted into the changing global division of labour. This has prompted concern with 
international economic competitiveness and supply-side intervention – initially to 
supplement national demand management, later as the primary objective and means 
of economic intervention. Yet no other scale of economic and political organization 
(whether the 'local' or the 'global', the 'urban' or the 'triadic', the 'regional' or the 
'supra-regional') has yet won a similar primacy. Indeed there is intense competition 
among different economic and political spaces to become the new anchorage point 
of accumulation around which the remaining scale levels (however many, however 
identified) can be organized in order to produce a suitable degree of structured 
coherence. This involves economic and political projects oriented to different scales 
and has not yet produced consensus on how these are to be reconciled.  
 
Thus we now see a proliferation of discursively constituted and institutionally 
materialized and embedded spatial scales (whether terrestrial, territorial, or 
telematic), that are related in increasingly complex tangled hierarchies rather than 
being simply nested one within the other, with different temporalities as well as 
spatialities. There is a marked degree of unstructured complexity as different scales 
of economic organization are consolidated structurally and/or are approached 
strategically as so many competing objects of economic management, governance, 
or regulation. There is an increasingly convoluted mix of scale strategies as 
economic and political forces seek the most favorable conditions for insertion into a 
changing international order. There is no pre-given set of places, spaces, or scales 
that are simply being re-ordered. For, in addition to the changing significance of old 
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places, spaces, scales, and horizons, new places are emerging, new spaces are 
being created, new scales of organization are being developed, and new horizons of 
action are being imagined. The resulting relativization of scale (Collinge 1999) has 
created both the perceived necessity for various forms of supra-national economic 
co-ordination and/or regulation as well as the possibility of regional or local 
resurgence within national economic spaces. The new politics of scale is still 
unresolved – although I suspect that 'triads' will eventually replace the nation as the 
primary scale for managing, displacing, and deferring the contradictions and 
dilemmas of a globalizing, knowledge-driven economy.  
 
This relativization of scale has major implications for claims about the rise of a 'global 
economy'. For, whatever the current level of globalization in structural and/or 
strategic terms (issues which are still disputed), few would claim that the global 
economy is now the predominant taken-for-granted economic space. Certainly it 
would be mistaken to see a single global economy rather than a range of competing 
tendencies and projects to form economic activities into such a system. This can be 
seen in the initial bifurcation of views of 'naturalness' from the 'national' towards the 
global and local economies – evident in the fact that talk of globalization exists 
alongside the rediscovery of the local or regional economy. Subsequent material and 
social developments have complicated this position, however, with the emergence of 
cyberspace as a virtual arena of action and the increased importance attached to the 
three triad regions as sites of economic and political governance.  
 
If a new primary scale is to emerge, it is likely to be at the level of the triad. This is 
particularly evident in the EU (especially as it continues to widen and deepen its role 
in structuring European economic space) and NAFTA (with the overwhelming 
dominance of the USA); but there is also a growing regional division of labour in East 
Asia and China is becoming a more significant player in this regard. Nonetheless, 
recognising the emergence of 'triad power' should not blind us to three other 
important tendencies: (a) the growing interpenetration of the triad powers themselves 
as they seek to develop and to deepen specific complementarities among the triads 
and as multinationals with headquarters in one triad form strategic alliances in 
others; (b) shifts in the spatial hierarchies within each triad due to uneven 
development – reflected not only in shifts among 'national economies' but also in the 
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rise and fall of regions, new forms of 'north-south' divide, and so forth; and (c) the re-
emergence of regional and local economies within some national economies or, in 
some cases, cross-cutting national borders – whether such resurgence is part of the 
overall globalization process and/or develops in reaction to it. All of these changes 
have their own material and/or strategic bases. 
 
As well as these macro-regional tendencies (triads), there are other sub-global axes 
of regional organization with global implications. These include industrial districts, 
innovation milieus, learning regions, cross-border regions, and cities. Significant 
changes are affecting all of them. For example, three major changes affect the 
position of the urban. First, there is a vast expansion of the size of leading cities 
within urban hierarchies so that they become larger metropolitan or regional entities 
with several centres. Second, as globalization develops further, cities' activities are 
increasingly structurally integrated and strategically oriented beyond national space. 
This creates potential conflicts with the national state as some cities become 
potential 'regional states' less oriented to their respective national hinterlands than to 
their ties with cities and economic spaces abroad. Third, paradoxically, some leading 
cities have become state-sponsored and state-protected 'national champions' in the 
face of intensifying international competition. This contrasts with earlier periods when 
it was specific firms or sectors that served as national champions. 
 
For these and other reasons it is important to take account of the 'relativization of 
scale' and its implications for economic, political, and social strategies. This process 
involves very different opportunities and threats for economic, political, and social 
forces compared to the period when the national scale could be taken for granted as 
primary; and it encourages actions both to exploit the processes producing 
globalization to promote specific values, identities, and interests and/or to defend 
them against the frequently disruptive impact of globalization. Thus economic actors 
may engage in strategic alliances to extend their global reach or seek protection 
from global competition behind various protective barriers. Also, as these complex 
and contradictory processes unfold, states on various levels tackle the domestic 
repercussions of global restructuring by getting involved in identifying and managing 
the manifold processes that contribute to globalization.  
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This in turn points to potential for alliance strategies among states on similar or 
different regional scales (e.g., the European Union, whether as an intergovernmental 
organization of nation-states or a 'Europe of the regions') to secure the basis for 
economic and political survival as the imperatives of structural competitiveness on a 
global scale make themselves felt. These alliances will vary with the position of the 
economies concerned in the global hierarchy. Thus, whilst a small open economy 
(whether capitalist, post-socialist, or socialist) might seek closer integration with the 
dominant economic power in its immediate triadic growth pole, the dominant power 
might seek not only selectively to bind neighbouring economies into its strategic 
economic orbit but also to enter alliances with other dominant triad powers. An 
alternative strategy for a small open economy is to seek niche markets in the global 
economy (perhaps through encouraging strategic alliances with key firms in each 
triad region) or to form regional alliances with other small economies (whether they 
share borders or not) as a basis of increasing their economic capacities and 
leverage. Moreover, since the national economy is no longer so taken-for-granted, 
we also find sub-national regions, cities, and local economic spaces pursuing 
strategies oriented to the changing forms of globalization and international 
competitiveness. Inter alia this is reflected in the formation of strategic alliances 
between provinces, sub-federal states, regions, cities, and localities in different 
national states to promote competitiveness or co-ordinate political strategies 
(Hocking 1999). Such activities are often linked to various forms of 'entrepreneurial' 
city and region as well as in 'competition' (sometimes also called 'Schumpeterian') 
states on different levels. An important aspect of each of these different spatial scale 
strategies is their concern to limit competition within the region (structured 
coherence) through market-oriented cooperation as the basis of more effective 
competition beyond the relevant spatial scale. Yet other economic, social, or political 
forces may call for protectionism on different scales as past regional and local 
modes of growth are disrupted (ranging from 'Fortress Europe' to 'new localisms', 
from the Sao Paulo Forum or the People's Plan for the Twenty-First Century to the 





The Illogics of Capitalist Globalization 
 
The problem of re-regulating capital accumulation after the Fordist crisis is not 
reducible to one of finding new ways of managing the old contradictions within the 
same spatio-temporal matrix. This is not just because the primary and secondary 
aspects of the two principal structural forms in Atlantic Fordism (the wage relation 
and money form) have been reversed. It is also because other contradictions and 
their associated dilemmas have become more dominant and the spatio-temporal 
contexts in which all the above-mentioned contradictions are expressed have 
become more complex. I will not spend much time here with the wage relation and 
money forms of after-Fordist economies. These have been widely and intensively 
discussed and it is not yet proven that after-Fordist forms of wage relation and 
money have successfully resolved the crisis-tendencies of Fordism as opposed to 
deferring and/or displacing them and, in so doing, creating new forms of international 
and national disorder. This is especially clear in the dominant neo-liberal form of 
after-Fordist restructuring. For this reinforces the abstract-formal moment of 
exchange value in the structural forms of capital at the expense of the substantive-
material moment of use value. It is capital in these abstract moments that is most 
easily disembedded from specific places and thereby freed to 'flow' freely through 
space and time. However, in each of its more concrete moments, as noted above, 
capital has its own particular productive and reproductive requirements.  
 
These requirements can often be materialized only in specific types of spatio-
temporal location. This leads to a general tension between neo-liberal demands to 
accelerate the flow of abstract (money) capital through an increasingly disembedded 
space and the need for the more concrete forms of capital to be 'fixed' in time and 
place as well as embedded in specific social relations as a condition for their 
valorization. Indeed, even where the two forms are relatively de-coupled as distinct 
fractions of capital, a concrete 'spatio-temporal fix' is still needed to enable 
disembedded capital to flow more easily (Harvey 1982). In the case of global finance 
capital, of course, the grid of global cities (Sassen 1996) provides this 'fix'. Moreover, 
since abstract capital or 'capital in general' cannot be valorized without the 
continuing valorization of at least some particular capitals (as well as, perhaps, 
through competition, uneven development, and 'gales of creative destruction', the 
 40
devalorization of others), this general tension inevitably creates a whole series of 
contradictions and dilemmas. 
 
Some of these contradictions were considered in discussing the crisis of Atlantic 
Fordism and the KWNS. I now consider three new contradictions and dilemmas that 
have emerged in the present period of 'after-Fordist' accumulation that are closely 
associated with the dynamics of globalization. These comprise: first, a dissociation 
between abstract flows in space and concrete valorization in place; second, a 
growing short-termism in economic calculation vs an increasing dependence of 
valorization on extra-economic factors that take a long time to produce; and, third, 
the contradiction between the information economy and the information society. In 
addition, though it is not a structural contradiction, major problems surround the ideal 
spatio-temporal fix, if any, within which the new configuration of contradictions might 
prove manageable. 
 
The first contradiction expresses the growing separation between the exchange-
value and use-value aspects of the value form that is enabled by the neo-liberal form 
of globalization. The best-known case is the separation of hypermobile financial 
capital from productive capital – with the former moving in an abstract space of 
flows, the latter still needing to be valorized in place. For, whereas money capital in 
its various forms is enabled to circulate further and faster around the globe, particular 
commodities must be produced using particular assets in particular places. The 
intensification of this contradiction is closely linked to the development of information 
and communication technologies, to the emergence of cyberspace, and to the 
creation of 'offshore' bases for capital's financial operations. But the same 
contradiction also appears within the individual circuits of financial, industrial, and 
commercial capital as well as within their interconnections. For, admittedly in 
different ways, each circuit depends on a complex relation between what Kelly 
(1998: 96) describes as a physical marketplace and a conceptual marketspace. 
However much economic activity migrates into cyberspace, territorialization remains 
essential to capital. Capital 'remains as dependent as ever upon relatively fixed, 
place-bound technological-institutional ensembles in which technology, the means of 
production, forms of industrial organization and labor-power are productively 
combined to create and extract surplus-value' (Brenner 1997, 11-12). As well as the 
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grid of global cities and the role of innovation milieus, industrial districts, etc., even e-
commerce needs such a distribution infrastructure – if only servers and optic fibre 
cables for a 'celestial jukebox' of digitalized music. Thus, an emerging globalizing, 
knowledge-driven, after-Fordism does not signal the final transcendence of spatial 
barriers but effects 'new and more complex articulations of the dynamics of mobility 
and fixity' (Robins and Gillespie 1992, 149). 
 
The second contradiction is seen in the paradox noted by Veltz (1996: 12) that '(t)he 
most advanced economies function more and more in terms of the extra-economic'. 
The paradox rests on the growing interdependence between the economic and 
extra-economic factors making for structural or systemic competitiveness. This is 
linked to new technologies based on more complex transnational, national, and 
regional systems of innovation, to the paradigm shift from the Fordist concern with 
productivity growth rooted in economies of scale to concern with mobilising social as 
well as economic sources of flexibility and entrepreneurialism, and to the more 
general attempts to penetrate micro-social relations in the interests of valorization. 
 
This paradox is further intensified by the growing mobility of capital on a global scale. 
Regardless of scale, however, this paradox generates major new contradictions that 
affect the spatial and temporal organization of accumulation. Thus, temporally, there 
is a major contradiction between short-term economic calculation (especially in 
financial flows) and the long-term dynamic of 'real competition' rooted in resources 
(skills, trust, collective mastery of techniques, economies of agglomeration and size) 
which take years to create, stabilize, and reproduce. It is reflected in the growing 
emphasis given to social capital, trust, and communities of learning as well as the 
enhanced role of competitiveness based on entrepreneurial cities, an enterprise 
culture, and enterprising subjects. Interestingly, the reflexivity that is often said to 
characterize post-Fordism enhances this contradiction: it takes time to create 
collective learning capacities but '(t)hose firms, sectors, regions and nations which 
can learn faster or better (higher quality or cheaper for a given quality) become 
competitive because their knowledge is scarce and cannot be immediately imitated 
by new entrants or transferred, via codified and formal channels, to competitor firms, 
regions or nations' (Storper 1998, 250). And, spatially, there is a fundamental 
contradiction between the economy considered as a pure space of flows and the 
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economy as a territorially and/or socially embedded system of extra-economic as 
well as economic resources and competencies. The latter moment is reflected in the 
wide range of emerging concepts to describe the knowledge-driven economy – 
national, regional, and local systems of innovation, innovative milieus, systemic or 
structural competitiveness, learning regions, social capital, trust, speed-based 
competition, etc.. These different aspects of Veltz's paradox are taken to new levels 
by the growing mobility of capital on a global scale. For this enables mobile capital to 
engage in short-term exploitation of extra-economic resources in one area without 
contributing to their long-term reproduction and then move elsewhere to engage in 
the same short-term behaviour. This holds not only for the exploitation of renewable 
and non-renewable natural resources but also for that of socially-reproduced use-
values. An alternative strategy in this regard is seen in the selective migration 
controls that enable the costs of reproducing labour-power as a fictitious commodity 
to be borne in some areas and exploited for the benefit of capital in other places. A 
large part of the neo-liberal agenda for trade and investment is concerned with 
promoting the juridico-political conditions for such conduct and thereby reinforcing 
this contradiction by reinforcing the separation between the winners and losers from 
its realization. 
 
A third contradiction that becomes important once again in the after-Fordist (or, at 
least, the post-industrial) accumulation regime is that between the increasing 
socialization of the productive forces and the continued dominance of private control 
in the social relations of production in networked knowledge-driven economies. 
Although this contradiction exists on many different scales, it is certainly reinforced 
by globalization. For this both widens the arena in which the contradiction can 
develop and over which it plays itself out as it matures. On the one hand, the 
growing importance of economies of agglomeration and, above all, so-called 
'economies of networks' significantly enhances the socialization of productive forces. 
For the 'economies of networks' are generated in and through multi-actor, 
polycentric, and multiscalar networks rather than by single (or quasi-vertically 
integrated) organizations, which are better able to realize economies of scale. In 
addition, there are almost exponentially increasing returns to network size. These 
mean that 'each additional member increases the network's value, which in turn 
attracts more members, initiating a spiral of benefits' (Kelly 1998: 25). These two 
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features highlight the importance of the socialization of productive forces because 
they make it 'difficult legally to distinguish between different firms' intellectual 
property, since all intellectual property is a mixture of innovations arising from 
different places' (Kundnani 1998-9, 56). This in turn reinforces the tendency for 
network economies to be captured by the network as a whole – albeit often 
asymmetrically – rather than by a particular firm (Kelly 1998, 26-28). This suggests in 
turn the opportunity for new forms of enterprise to appropriate such network 
economies for private profit without destroying any broader network(s) involved in 
generating them. 'Virtual' firms and networked firms are said to correspond to this 
need (e.g., Castells 1996, 151-200) – although recent mega-mergers such as that 
between AOL and Time-Warner suggest that other, older solutions may still be 
viable. On the other hand, however, unless the 'virtual' firm becomes co-extensive 
with the collective labourer, the contradiction is still reproduced on the side of the 
social relations of production. For it is in the interests of every capital to have free 
access to the information, knowledge, expertise, and network economies that it 
needs to produce its own exchange-values and to be able to charge for the 
information, knowledge, expertise, and access to networks that it can produce for 
exchange. A particularly interesting current manifestation of this contradiction is the 
conflicts occurring around intellectual property rights regimes. 
 
A fourth site of problems in the globalizing economy is linked to the relativization of 
scale. It concerns the spatio-temporal fix(es), if any, in and through which the old 
principal contradictions of Atlantic Fordism and newly important contradictions of the 
current period might prove manageable. This is closely linked to a new complexity of 
time-space due to the interaction of new forms of 'time-space distantiation' and 'time-
space compression'. Facilitated by new information and communication technologies 
and enthusiastically embraced by some fractions of capital (and some states), this 
helped erode the spatio-temporal fix of Atlantic Fordism. The further intensification of 
both processes makes it more difficult to find new scale(s) on which to restabilize 
accumulation and establish effective regulation and governance mechanisms. 
 
The importance of these contradictions and the relativization of scale in the 'after-
Fordism' period suggest that a stable post-Fordist regime has not yet emerged either 
in the space of Atlantic Fordism or on a wider scale that would correspond to the 
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emerging global capitalist economy. If pressed to identify the principal contradictions 
around which a new accumulation regime would crystallize I would suggest that they 
comprise the forms of competition (notably the growing importance of the extra-
economic conditions of competitiveness and hence their colonization by the value 
form and, tied to this as well as the new knowledge-driven technological paradigm, 
the emergence of the networked firm as the dominant organizational paradigm) and 
the forms of the state (notably its restructuring in the light of the relativization of scale 
and of the incapacity of traditional state forms to govern the new economy). I have 
addressed both sets of issues in my recent work on the shift from the KWNS typical 
of Atlantic Fordism to an emerging Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime 
(SWPR) that could help re-regularize an after-Fordist accumulation regime (see 
Jessop 1993, 1994, 1999b, 1999c). 
 
Globalization, Politics, and the State 
 
My main substantive argument so far is that the tendential ecological dominance of 
the capitalist economy has been reinforced by the recent waves of globalization as 
well as by other changes in its structure and operations. This occurs because 
globalization enhances those generic features of the capitalist economy favourable 
to its exercise of greater influence on other systems and the lifeworld than they can 
have on it. This is associated with the emergence (or increased significance) of 
contradictions and dilemmas within the capitalist economy that encourage further 
colonization of other systems and the lifeworld in order to secure the conditions for 
continued valorization. But my argument would remain seriously incomplete if I did 
not directly address the other major system in the emerging world society with some 
claim to ecological dominance – the political system. This should not be confused 
with the state – let alone with the national state or even the sum of national states. 
Instead the political system, considered as an operationally autonomous system, 
comprises all those activities, organizations, and institutions organized around (or at 
least involved in) making collectively binding decisions for an imagined political 
community. In short, states do not exhaust the political system: they constitute just 
one, albeit important, part of the latter. Moreover, once we focus on the political 
system, we can see that the state, like capital, is a social relation (Poulantzas 1978: 
128-9). This excludes any treatment of the state either as a simple instrument or as a 
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subject. Instead it requires us to consider state power (not the state apparatus) as a 
form-determined condensation of the balance of forces in struggle over the making 
of collectively binding decisions in the name of an imagined political community.20 At 
the most abstract level of analysis of capital accumulation, this form determination is 
mediated through the institutional separation of the economic and political systems 
(and their common separation from the lifeworld) together with the separation of the 
state apparatus from the rest of the political system. Whereas the former separation 
is essential to the self-valorization of capital despite its dependence on fictitious 
commodities that cannot be reproduced exclusively in and through the value form, 
the latter separation is essential to the autopoiesis of the political system in providing 
a reference point for political struggles in the face of the infinity of possible political 
goals and political communities. 
 
In this sense, the demarcation between state and political system should be seen as 
a line drawn internally within the network of institutional mechanisms through which 
political power is exercised. Indeed, as Mitchell argues, ‘[t]he state should be 
addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal 
arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create 
the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society. The essence 
of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to 
or shaped by the other, but the producing and reproducing of this line of difference' 
(Mitchell 1991: 95). Exploring the theme of the state as a social relation involves two 
interrelated aspects of the state system. We need first to examine the state form as a 
complex institutional ensemble with a specific pattern of 'strategic selectivity' which 
reflects and modifies the balance of forces in political struggle; and, second, to 
consider the constitution of these forces and their strategies themselves, including 
their capacity to reflect on and respond to the strategic selectivities inscribed within 
the state apparatus as a whole (on strategic selectivity, see Jessop 1990a, 1990b). It 
is this latter capacity which is so crucial to a proper understanding of the 
                                            
20  The equivalent view of capital as a social relation would treat capital accumulation 
(not capital as a factor of production) as a form-determined condensation of the 
balance of forces in struggle over the production and appropriation of surplus-value. 
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reorganization of the state apparatus and state power as actors in the political 
system respond to globalization.  
  
Thus, to explore the relations between the economic and political systems in an era 
of globalization, it is important to distinguish between the state apparatus and the 
political system. For this is a materially- and discursively-constituted distinction that 
makes a difference in politics. It is also important to accept the idea implicit in 
systems theory that the political system is self-substituting, i.e., that a crisis in the 
political system does not lead to its demise but to its reorganization. Clearly a 
fundamental part of such reorganization would include the redefinition of the 
restructuring of the 'line of difference' (or demarcation) between the state and the 
political system as well as the forms of institutional separation between the economic 
and political systems and their relationship to the lifeworld. This is the approach 
adopted below and I begin with further reflections on the state.  
 
The national state is a relatively recent institutional expression of the territorialization 
of political power. It is the historical product of a specific, socially constructed 
territorial demarcation of the political system and divides the latter into a series of 
territorially exclusive, mutually recognizing, mutually validating, sovereign states. 
These in turn provide the reference point for political struggles and, indeed, the 
distinction between domestic and international politics. Other modes of territorializing 
political power have existed, new expressions are emerging, yet others can be 
imagined. Thus it is crucial to study the potential for the re-structuring of statehood 
through the de- and re-territorialization of political power. It follows that it is highly 
misleading to conceive the relationship between a singular emergent globalizing 
flow-based economy and a plurality of traditional national territorial states in zero-
sum terms. For this would involve treating the current, partly globalization-induced 
crisis of the territorial national state – whether in its post-war Atlantic Fordist form, 
developmental statist, national security state, or other forms – as signifying the 
present and future impossibility of any other institutional form(s) for the 
territorialization of political power. Instead the approach developed here suggests 
that attempts will be made to reconstitute the national territorial state in response to 
globalization and/or to establish new territorial scales as the primary nodal point of 
the institutionalization of political power. This expectation is reinforced if we note that 
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the westphalian state was never as rigid or as complete as 'the fetishization of space 
in the service of the [national] state' (Lefebrve 1978; cf. 1991: 280-2) might suggest. 
Moreover, once we accept that the delimitation of the state as an institutional 
ensemble is both internal to the political system and contingent, we can also assess 
whether non-territorialized forms of government-governance might acquire increased 
significance in the exercise of political power. These points are reinforced when we 
recall the constitutive incompleteness of the capitalist economy and its dependence 
on extra-economic factors. For this suggests that economic globalization will require 
significant shifts in the institutional forms, principal activities, and primary scales in 
and through which its extra-economic supports are secured. 
 
To consider the scope for de- and re-territorialization of forms of state power and/or 
for the substitution of non-territorial forms of political power, we must reconsider the 
alleged challenge to national states posed by globalization. The scope for increased 
ecological dominance of the globalizing economy depends on the capacities of 
leading economic forces to distantiate and/or compress time-space in ways that 
escape the control capacities of most state-based and state-oriented political forces. 
For there are few, if any, individual states with an effective global reach and an ability 
to compress their routines to match the time-space of fast hypermobile capital. This 
creates a growing disjunction between the latter's spatio-temporal horizons and 
routines and those of most contemporary states and, through their impact on the 
overall dynamic of the capitalist economy, a growing disjunction between a 
potentially global space of flows and the place-boundedness of a territorially 
segmented political system. Temporally this limits the typical state's ability to react 
according to its own routines and modes of calculation – which is why many state 
managers feel the pressures of globalization and believe they have lost operational 
autonomy. Likewise, spatially, given the porosity of borders to many different kinds of 
flow and the growing mobility of capital over a range of transnational scales, states 
find it increasingly hard, should they want to, to contain economic, political, and 
social processes within their borders or control flows across these borders. These 
changes are related in turn to a growing fragmentation of the westphalian state 
system to the extent, indeed, that some commentators suggest it is being re-placed 
by a neo-medieval system (e.g., Anderson 1996; Cerny 1997; Ruggie 1993).  
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In the short-term these spatio-temporal changes reduce the capacity of states and 
political systems in general to follow their normal operating procedures in responding 
to major economic events – which tends to produce a sense of crisis or 
powerlessness. This is reflected in reactive fire-fighting, a turn towards short-term 
emergency measures or more durable 'states of exception', and fatalistic submission 
to the demands of (potentially) mobile capital. In the medium term, however, as a 
self-organizing, self-substituting system, more effective responses to this tendential 
erosion of operational autonomy should develop, get selected, and become 
stabilized. These could well arise from 'chance discoveries' and random variation 
but, provided that the economic environment is relatively stable, they should become 
consolidated. This process will be characterized by structural coupling and blind co-
evolution, of course; but, within certain limits, it can also be reflexively guided and 
strategically co-ordinated. Over time it may lead to new historic blocs and new 
unstable equilibria of compromise on a global scale. Before addressing such 
possibilities, however, let us consider the more general forms of the reorganization of 
the state and the political system.  
 
This re-organization can be expected to include the following analytically distinct but 
empirically interrelated and often overlapping changes: 
• a dialectic of de-territorialization and re-territorialization of specific powers in 
the political system, hence a reshaping of national states qua mutually 
exclusive, formally sovereign, spatially segmented instantiations of the 
westphalian order, the transfer of powers previously located at this territorial 
level upwards, downwards, or sideways, and the allocation of new powers to 
different scales;  
• a dialectic of de-statization and re-statization as the internal demarcation 
within the institutional ensemble of political power is redefined and activities 
are re-allocated across this division; 
• a re-articulation of the relationship between territorial and functional spaces in 
the political system, with implications for the significance of territorial 'power 
containers' on any scale as opposed to non-territorial forms of political power;  
• a redefinition of the boundaries and division of labour between the political 
and economic systems in securing the reproduction-régulation of the capital 
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relation to take account of the re-articulation of the economic and extra-
economic in an era of increasing systemic and/or structural competition;  
• a re-ordering of political hierarchies associated with the relativization of scale 
noted above – with implications for the restructuring of international relations, 
domestic relations, and the interrelations between them; 
• a re-imagination of the political communities (or publics) to which the political 
system is oriented together with new state projects to redefine the nature and 
purposes of the state and new hegemonic projects to redefine the imagined 
general interest of these new political communities. 
 
I will now offer some brief comments on each of these axes of reorganization and 
their interconnections in relation to the globalizing capitalist economy. But it is first 
necessary to caution against treating states as if they were identical units. For the 
formal sovereignty accorded to national territorial states in the westphalian system 
does not imply any substantive identity or equality among them in terms of their 
capacities for exercising power internally and/or in the international arena. They will 
be presented with different problems by the multi-scalar, multi-temporal, multi-centric 
processes that generate globalization; and they will have different capacities to 
address these problems and reorganize themselves in response. Moreover, whereas 
the form-determined condensation of forces in some states leads state managers to 
resist globalization, other states are clearly heavily committed to promoting it in one 
form or another. I have already commented above on different scalar strategies in 
this regard and will not repeat these comments. Suffice to say that leading states are 
associated with different globalization projects and that less powerful states will often 
seek to position their economic spaces and actors more favourably within more 
specific local, regional, or functional niches within the emerging global division of 
labour. In so doing some states will reinforce their hegemony or dominance within 
the inter-state system, others will fall further down the inter-state hierarchy. In 
particular, after worries were expressed about its declining hegemony in the wake of 
the crisis of Atlantic Fordism, the USA has clearly gained in global influence in recent 
years through its identification with and promotion of globalization in its own image. 
 
First, then, de- and re-territorialization are occurring. Given the primacy of the 
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national scale in the advanced capitalist economies in the era of Atlantic Fordism, 
this can be described as the 'hollowing out' of the national state or, in more formal 
terms, as the de-nationalization of statehood. Thus the complex articulation of 
global-regional-national-local economies is linked to the transfer of powers 
previously exercised by national states upwards to supra-regional or international 
bodies, downwards to regional or local states, or outwards to relatively autonomous 
cross-national alliances among local metropolitan or regional states with 
complementary interests. The post-war primacy of the national scale of state power 
depended on the coincidence of national economy, national state, national 
citizenship, and national society and on the national state's survival as a sovereign 
body able to secure this coincidence. This structured coherence and its associated 
spatio-temporal fixes have been weakened by many of the processes usually 
subsumed under the rubric of globalization. The national economy has been 
undermined by internationalization, the growth of multi-tiered global city networks, 
the formation of triad economies (such as the European Union), and the re-
emergence of regional and local economies in national states. In addition, the unity 
of the nation-state has been weakened by the (admittedly uneven) growth of multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural societies and of divided political loyalties (with the 
resurgence of regionalism and nationalism as the rise of European identities, 
diasporic networks, cosmopolitan patriotism, etc.) (Jessop 1999a). 
 
Second, there is a process of de- and re-statization. This involves the re-allocation of 
functions across the internal demarcation between public and private responsibilities 
within each territorialized political system. This is often described as a shift from 
government to governance but this slogan is misleading to the extent that it depicts 
the shifts as essentially one-way. In practice there may well be an asymmetrical shift 
in this direction but there is also traffic in the other direction as new responsibilities 
are acquired by states on different scales. 
 
Third, there are changes in the relationship between territorialized and functionalized 
modes of exercising political power. At stake here is not the transfer of powers 
between different scales (including new ones) of territorialized power ('hollowing out') 
but the growth of modes of exercising power that do not depend on imperative co-
ordination by a territorialized state apparatus and that are independent of its borders 
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on whatever scale they exist.  This process is often subsumed under the rubric of the 
shift from government to governance but it differs from the second set of changes 
noted above in being essentially extra-territorial and in dissociating the exercise of 
political power from imagined political communities whose interests are tied to 
territorialized state power. One way to distinguish between the second and third 
processes is to consider de-statization as involving public-private partnerships in 
which the state devolves responsibilities to the private sphere but attempts to remain 
primus inter pares; and to consider the growth of functionalized forms of power as 
involving self-organization that by-passes or circumvents state power – perhaps at 
the behest of state managers. The increasing importance of international regimes to 
the relative stabilization of a globalizing economy and the rise of cybernetworks in an 
extra-territorial, telematic space allegedly beyond state control are two contrasting 
examples of third process.  
 
Fourth, there has also been expansion in the imagined scope and inclusiveness of 
the economy that needs governing through states, public-private partnerships, or 
functional networks. The economy is no longer interpreted in narrow terms but has 
been extended to include many additional factors, deemed 'non-economic' under the 
KWNS regime, that affect economic performance. This expansion is reflected in 
concepts such as 'structural competitiveness' (Chesnais 1987) or 'systemic 
competitiveness' (Messner 1997) – concepts that highlight the combined impact of 
diverse societal factors on competitiveness. This requires attention to a growing 
range of economically relevant practices, institutions, functional systems, and 
domains of the lifeworld to enhance competitiveness. This has two interesting and 
paradoxical effects on states and politics that are reflected in the two preceding sets 
of changes. First, whilst it expands the potential scope of state intervention for 
economic purposes, the resulting complexity renders post-war top-down intervention 
less effective – requiring that the state retreat from some areas of intervention and 
re-invent itself as a condition for more effective intervention in others (Messner 
1997). And, second, whilst it increases the range of stakeholders whose cooperation 
is required for successful state intervention, it also increases pressures within the 
state to create new subjects to act as its partners. Thus states are now trying to 
transform the identities, interests, capacities, rights, and responsibilities of economic 
and social forces so that they become more flexible, capable, and reliable agents of 
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the state's new economic strategies – whether in partnership with the state and/or 
with each other or as autonomous entrepreneurial subjects in the new knowledge-
driven economy (Barry et al., 1996; Deakin and Edwards 1993; Jones 1999). 
 
Fifth, political hierarchies are being re-ordered. The nested hierarchy of state power 
within territorially exclusive sovereign states and formal equality among such states 
was, of  course, never fully realized in the westphalian system; but it did provide the 
institutional architecture within which forces struggled for control of state power and 
attempted to modify the balance of power in international relations. The 
decomposition of national spatio-temporal fixes, the de-nationalization of statehood 
and the dual de-statization of politics (i.e., the shifting internal demarcation between 
public and private and the growth of functional power networks) have since 
contributed to a relativization of scale and an increasingly convoluted, tangled, and 
eccentric set of relations among different scales of political organization. The 
structural coherence of the Atlantic Fordist spatio-temporal fix has decomposed and 
there is a marked degree of unstructured complexity as different scales of economic 
and political organization proliferate and different scale strategies are pursued. 
 
Sixth, the political communities (or publics) towards which forces in the political 
system orient their actions are being re-imagined. These include, but are not 
exhausted by: new 'imagined nations' oriented to autonomy within and/or control of a 
defined territory below, above, or transversal to existing national states; a global civil 
society premised on cosmopolitan patriotism, the primacy of human rights over 
national citizenship, or some other global identity; new 'communities of fate' defined 
by shared risks regardless of specific territorial location and, perhaps, global in 
character (e.g., the risks generated by global warming); and new communities of 
interest defined by shared identities, interests, and values regardless of specific 
territorial location (e.g., cybercommunities). Such new territorial or extra-territorial 
conceptions of political community are linked to struggles to redefine the nature and 
purposes of the state, to find alternatives to territorialized forms of political power, 
and to redefine the imagined general interest which political power, whether territorial 
or not, should serve.  
 
So far I have described these shifts in general terms. I now want to make two further, 
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final points about the ecological dominance of the capitalist economy in a global era 
and about states' capacities to reorganize themselves in response to globalization. 
Let me deal first with the adaptive capacities of states. Each of the six trends noted 
above has been alleged to involve a decline in the powers of the dominant forms of 
state associated with the Atlantic Fordist era. Whether or not this is true in the short-
term, it does not exclude creative adaptation to the erosion of state power. The 
viability of such responses nonetheless depends either on their compatibility with the 
ecological dominance of the capitalist economy or their ability to contest, resist, and 
reverse this dominance. Which of these alternatives comes to dominate depends in 
turn on political struggles and this will determine the subsequent structural coupling 
and co-evolution of the economic and political systems on a global scale. 
 
The de-nationalization of statehood and the re-ordering of political hierarchies are 
both associated with an enhanced role for national states in interscalar management, 
i.e., attempts to control the articulation of scales and the transfer of powers between 
them. This applies to the forms and scope of functional networks and cyberspace(s) 
and the activities that occur within them as well as to the re-articulation of terrestrial 
and territorial scales. Thus national states have an important role in the production 
and regulation of extra-territorial spaces, such as offshore financial centres, export 
processing zones, flagging out, and tax havens. For this 'create[s] spaces of 
differential regulation within and across states that add to the functionality of the 
border as much as they contradict it' (Cameron and Palan 1999: 280) and thereby 
helps to lubricate global flows of capital. States are likewise involved in the 
development and institutionalization of the new lex mercatoria because this has 
distinct strategic selectivities that differentially affect states and the economic spaces 
with which they are associated. Similar points obtain for the emerging governance of 
cyberspace (Loader 1997; Kahin and Keller 1997; Kahin and Nesson 1997; Saco 
1999). Other levels of state may also try to engage in interscalar management but 
even the European Union, the most advanced supranational state apparatus, still 
lacks the powers and legitimacy to do this to the same extent as national states – 
especially larger member states. This does not exclude strategic alliances among 
states on various scales to steer interscalar articulation or an eventual new scale of 
territorial state that has acquired the necessary powers and legitimacy to co-ordinate 
the proliferating scales of action and to institutionalize new spatio-temporal fixes 
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around this new primary scale. Indeed at least one commentator has already 
discerned the emergence of a global state (admittedly orchestrated by the USA) that 
is superseding the 'western state' that presided over the Atlantic Fordist era (Shaw 
1997). Whether this is really better understood as a new primary scale on which 
political power is being territorialized or as an important emerging secondary scale 
(or nodal point) around which national states seek to pool their sovereignty in pursuit 
of common interests is open to discussion. In either case it would clearly involve new 
forms of parallel power network and strategic co-ordination to ensure the overall 
institutional integration and strategic coherence of policies pursued at this level. My 
own view is that the trends that Shaw identifies are currently part of the overall 
relativization of scale and therefore feed into the competition to define a new primary 
scale of action rather than resolve it.  
 
Likewise, regarding the dual shift from government to governance, there is a 
counter-trend in the shift from government to meta-governance (or, better, meta-
steering). For even as states cede their claim to sovereignty in the face of growing 
complex interdependence and seek to enhance their political capacities by 
participating in heterarchic co-ordination mechanisms or devolving some activities to 
private institutions and actors, they also seek to shape and steer these mechanisms 
through meta-steering practices. Thus states (on various scales) tend to get more 
involved in organizing the self-organization of partnerships, networks, and regimes. 
They provide the ground rules for governance; ensure the compatibility of different 
governance mechanisms and regimes; deploy a relative monopoly of organizational 
intelligence and information with which to shape cognitive expectations; act as a 
'court of appeal' for disputes arising within and over governance; seek to re-balance 
power differentials by strengthening weaker forces or systems in the interests of 
system integration and/or social cohesion; try to modify the self-understanding of 
identities, strategic capacities, and interests of individual and collective actors in 
different strategic contexts and hence alter their implications for preferred strategies 
and tactics; and also assume political responsibility in the event of governance 
failure. Of course, meta-steering is prone to failure just like markets, states, and 
governance mechanisms. But, insofar as they do succeed, however relatively, their 
success will depend on their fit with (and contribution to) the stabilization of the new 
(or newly redefined) objects of regulation and governance. 
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The expanded definition of the economic to include factors previously regarded as 
extra-economic clearly involves a key role for states (on whatever scale) in mediating 
this re-articulation, steering the resulting commodification and re-commodification of 
social relations, and dealing with the consequences of the increasing ecological 
dominance of capitalist logic on social cohesion and social exclusion. Moreover, 
whereas the promotion of the micro-social conditions for capital accumulation in 
these changing circumstances may well be better handled at other levels than the 
national, problems of territorial integration, social cohesion, and social exclusion are 
currently still best handled at the level of the large territorial national state.21 For the 
latter is still currently non-substitutable given its fisco-financial powers and its scope 
for redistributive politics in re-arranging spatio-temporal fixes.22  
 
The emergence of new imagined political communities is too complex to discuss in 
detail here but it is certainly worth noting how they are shaped by the growing 
ecological dominance of the capitalist economy within the system and lifeworlds. 
This is associated with the intensification of the contradictions of capitalism on a 
global scale – especially when system assumes neo-liberal form – and invites the 
rescaling of political communities and their responses to the resulting perturbations. 
The relativization of scale is likewise linked to the search for new spatio-temporal 
fixes on various scales and these always involve deferring and displacing the 
material and social costs of the fix and its associated institutionalized compromises 
onto marginal classes, strata, social categories, and spaces. These processes also 
lead to projects to brake, resist, or overturn the dominance of the globalizing 
capitalist economy and/or to complement it through the development of new forms of 
                                            
21 The national states of small open economies may lack the resources to 
compensate for the consequences of globalization and the demands of systemic 
competitiveness – especially where there are neo-liberal pressures to reduce the 
fisco-financial powers of the state. In this context there may a bigger role for 
international cooperation or emergent regional states such as the European Union.  
22 Indeed, as Lefebrve noted, '[o]nly the state can take on the task of managing 







This contribution has traversed much ground over many different scales and levels 
of analysis. And, given my scepticism about much work on this theme, it has not put 
globalization at the heart of the analysis. Instead it has attempted to situate 
globalization as a complex, chaotic, and overdetermined outcome of a multi-scalar, 
multi-temporal, and multi-centric series of processes operating in specific structural 
contexts and to assess the implications of the emergence of the global as the 
ultimate horizon of action in the economic and political systems. This explains why 
globalization often figures only tangentially in the preceding analysis. Indeed, insofar 
as the global is merely one scalar viewpoint from which to describe the complex, 
tangled, and interdependent re-scaling of capital accumulation or the changing 
structural coupling and co-evolution of the economic and political, globalization could 
have been written out of the script entirely at many points without losing the force of 
many of the theoretical and substantive arguments. For they could also have been 
illustrated in terms of changing forms of localization, regionalization, nationalization, 
triadization, cross-borderization, and so forth. Nonetheless a focus on globalization is 
justified insofar as the global is more than just one scalar viewpoint among many but 
actually involves significant qualitative shifts in the overall dynamic of capitalism and 
its structural coupling and co-evolution of the economic and political. I have argued 
strongly for the latter conclusions on three main grounds. 
 
First, the dominant neo-liberal form of capitalist globalization significantly enhances 
the generic tendencies of the capitalism economy to become the ecologically 
dominant system in global social order. Second, globalization has contributed 
significantly to the disruption and decomposition of the primarily national spatio-
temporal fixes that provided the framework in which the Atlantic Fordist accumulation 
regimes and their modes of regulation were established and consolidated. And, third, 
owing to the relativization of scale and the growing spatio-temporal complexities with 
which globalization is associated, no new spatio-temporal fix has yet emerged within 
which the illogic of the dominant neo-liberal form of globalization as reflected in its 
increasing contradictions, global-local disorder, and growing social polarization and 
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social exclusion could be tamed and through which global economic governance 
could be established.    
 
In pursuing these arguments in a much broader theoretical context I hope to have 
provided some substantive arguments that will serve as correctives to many of the 
more orthodox accounts of globalization. These arguments concern changes in 
capital accumulation and the state and their connection to globalization. They can be 
condensed into six main themes that will be presented here in telegrammatic form.  
 
The first theme is that of globalization as a 'chaotic conception'. Globalization is not 
an homogenous or homogenizing process; it is not a singular causal mechanism; it 
does not emanate from, nor is it initiated from, all points on the globe; and it does not 
develop evenly. Instead it is a contradictory, conflictual, contested, and complex 
resultant of multi-scalar, multi-temporal, multi-centric processes that develops 
unevenly in time and space, and, indeed, exploits and intensifies differences as 
much as, if not more than, it produces new complementarities and uniformities.  
 
The second theme concerns the importance of studying globalization at different 
levels of analysis from the systemic and inter-systemic through the institutional and 
inter-institutional and then the organizational and inter-organizational down to the 
personal and interpersonal. In particular I argued for a treatment of globalization as 
an emergent feature of the capitalist economy as a whole rather than of individual 
economic actors or specific territorial units. For globalization, as I define it, emerges 
from the interconnections among different actors on many different scales and is 
intensified through new forms of time-space distantiation and time-space 
compression. An important contributing factor here is, of course, the increased 
salience of the global as the ultimate horizon of action of a growing number of actors 
but even this does not require that all these actors then act on a global scale.  
 
The third theme concerns the importance of studying the complex relations between 
the two systems with the strongest capacities for ecological dominance within an 
emerging global society. These are the capitalist economy considered as an 
autopoietic system with its own profit-oriented operational code and institutional logic 
organized around the self-valorization of capital; and the political system considered 
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as an autopoietic system with its own power-oriented operational code and 
institutional logic organized around the self-reproduction of ruling-ruled relations and 
territorialization of power. Their relations are complex because of the constitutive 
incompleteness of the capital relation in the real world such that its reproduction-
régulation depends, in an unstable and contradictory way, on changing extra-
economic conditions; and because the political system in capitalist social formations 
cannot produce key material resources for the performance of its political functions 
but depends on revenues generated from a capitalist economy whose overall 
dynamic it cannot control.  This interdepence between operationally autonomous but 
substantively interdependent systems underpins the structural coupling, strategic co-
ordination, and overall co-evolution of the economic and political orders and, under 
the ecological dominance of the capitalist economy, gives rise to the apparent base-
superstructure relations in capitalist societies so beloved of orthodox marxism.  
 
The fourth theme is the importance for the reproduction-régulation of a constitutively 
incomplete capital relation of securing specific spatio-temporal fixes within which its 
contradictions and dilemmas can be managed. These serve to displace and/or defer 
certain aspects of these contradictions and dilemmas either within the boundaries of 
the spatio-temporal fix (onto marginal classes, strata, or social categories) or beyond 
them (onto other economic and political spaces). This is where questions of scale 
enter crucially into the analysis and it is important to study how scales are continually 
created and interconnected in new ways rather than seeing them as pre-given and 
unchanging.  Similar arguments hold for the temporal aspects of spatio-temporal 
fixes. 
 
The fifth theme concerns the growing ecological dominance of the capitalist 
economy. This has many different causes. Indeed, given the always relational and 
relative nature of ecological dominance, it certainly could not be reduced purely to 
changes within the economic domain. Nonetheless, among these different causes, 
some of the emergent features of globalization – especially in its dominant neo-
liberal form – do contribute significantly to this ecological dominance. In insisting on 
the complex nature of globalization as a resultant, however, I am also challenging 
the fatalism that comes from seeing it as an overwhelming, singular causal force. 
For, once we recognize its complexities, examine its different mechanisms, and 
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appreciate how they are instantiated on many different scales of action, there is 
scope for struggles to resist globalization and/or to change its dominant forms. This 
leads us to my final topic. 
 
The sixth theme concerns the response of the political system to the increasing 
ecological dominance of a globalizing capitalist economy. This has two very different 
faces. On the one hand, given the inherent inability of the capitalist economy to 
achieve self-closure and its need to be socially embedded within a market society 
and supported by state power, capitalist globalization is inconceivable without active 
involvement of at least some states in promoting the conditions for globalization. On 
the other hand, the existing institutional architecture of the state system and the 
more general spatio-temporal matrix of political routines make it difficult for the states 
and political systems that sustained accumulation regimes in the era of Atlantic 
Fordism to manage the transition to a new wave of accumulation on a more global 
scale or to cope with its consequences. In particular, the dominant, neo-liberal form 
of globalization and its associated 'politics of scale' intensify capital's basic structural 
contradictions and strategic dilemmas. This is reflected in struggles among different 
fractions of capital as well as in disputes within leading international economic and 
political agencies charged with global economic governance. It provides the context 
for a continuing and still unresolved search process to find new forms of state and 
new modes of governance on different scales to secure new spatio-temporal fixes 
within which accumulation on a world scale can be maintained – or to find new forms 
of state and new modes of governance with which to brake the (il)logics of 
accumulation on a world scale and develop alternative ways of organizing global-
local order. New projects for global governance, whether rooted in markets, states, 
or civil society, are unlikely to succeed as long as neo-liberal accumulation strategies 
are still dominant. But this does not justify resignation, fatalism, or a do-nothing 
approach. Instead it calls for a reflexive, ironic 'optimism of the will' as a necessary 
complement to 'pessimism of the intellect'. Indeed, given the conflictual, antagonistic 
nature of the globalization-regionalization dialectic, it always confronts forms of 
resistance and structural limits that make a fully constituted globality hard to imagine 
(Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996). It seems appropriate to conclude by repeating one of 
Gramsci's comments in a new conjuncture: 'the old is dying, the new cannot be born' 
. 
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